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I. INTRODUCTION
In every criminal prosecution the danger exists that the defendant, or
someone acting on her behalf, will attempt to influence the outcome of
the case through illegitimate means. For example, the defendant might
offer to pay a witness to change the story he originally gave to the
police;' or the defendant's sibling may try to coerce the witness into
altering his story by threatening physical violence;2 or the defendant's
1. To illustrate, an eyewitness to an armed robbery initially might have viewed a
lineup (identification parade) and identified the defendant as the person who committed
the crime. The defendant, or someone acting on her behalf, might later pay the witness
to testify that he was mistaken when he identified the defendant and that the defendant
was not the robber. Attorney-General's Reference (No. 92 of 2004), [2004] EWCA
(Crim) 2823, [4], [9] (Eng.) (shortly before his trial for aggravated battery, an individual
"was party to an attempt to bribe the victim," who had identified him in an identification
parade, "with the sum of £5,000 so as to alter his evidence against the offender" by
"retract[ing] his statement"); see also R v. Akhtar, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 2953, [6]
(Eng.) (an individual convicted of attempted murder and various other offenses was also
convicted of perverting the course of justice for "attempts to bribe witnesses to change
their evidence").
2. For instance, the defendant's sister may slap a witness and threaten to kill her
if she testifies against the accused. PETER FINN & KERRY MURPHY HEALEY, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING GANG- AND DRUG-RELATED WITNESS INTIMIDATION 2 (1996),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/163067.pdf. This is an example of "overt intimidation."
Overt intimidation occurs "when someone does something explicitly to intimidate a
witness into withholding, changing, or falsifying testimony." Id. at 1; e.g., Boulton v.
The Crown, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 942, [6], [26]-[27], [29] (Eng.) (while being held in
custody awaiting trial, an individual charged with, inter alia, rape and false imprisonment,
telephoned the alleged victim and threatened her if she did not change her story and
withdraw the charges against him); R v. Patrascu, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 2417, [2]-[3],
[2004] 4 All E.R. (Crim) 1066, 1067-68 (Eng.) (during an adjournment in his trial for
bcgging money in a public place, the defendant approached the alleged victim and
aggressively pleaded with him to testify falsely); see also R v. Dodd, [1982] 74 Crim.
App. 50, 53 (Eng.) (in a trial of several individuals for armed robbery, the police
informed the trial judge that "there was a sum of £30,000 on offer to try and deter [two
other participants in the robberies who had pleaded guilty to the crimes] from giving
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brother might bribe a potential witness to leave the jurisdiction or
otherwise be unavailable to testify against the defendant at trial.3
evidence" against the defendants).
In some cases, a suspect or an arrestee, or someone acting on his behalf, might pay or
intimidate a witness to change his story to the police before formal charges are filed.
E.g., People v. Cribas, 282 Cal. Rptr. 538, 539-41, 545-47 (Ct. App. 1991) (an individual
under arrest for rape was convicted of conspiring with his brother to bribe witnesses by
offering to pay money to the complainant and her boyfriend if they would withdraw the
charges); R v. Waithe, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2750, [4] (Eng.) (two days after a theft
victim had reported the incident to the police, one of the people he had implicated
approached a witness to the theft and told him that "he had told the police the wrong
thing and had to sort his story out," while another person told him that if he did not
change his statement to the police, "I will come and stab [the theft victim]"); R v.
Goodman, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 736, [6] (Eng.) (a pastor who was the subject of
indecent assault allegations threatened one of his accusers that, unless she withdrew her
allegation, a tabloid newspaper would print a story that the accuser, an adult, had had
sexual relations with a 15-year-old boy, a story based on an allegation the pastor knew
was false). Indeed, especially in cases involving domestic violence, the perpetrator of a
crime might threaten to inflict physical harm upon the victim if she reports the crime to
the police. Interview with Yvonne Rhoden, Detective Constable, Violent Crime Directorate,
Metro. Police, in London, Eng. (Mar. 26, 2007). E.g., State v. Harris, No. 55561-8, 2006
WL 2246194, at *2-*3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2006) (an individual was convicted of
witness intimidation for impliedly threatening his girlfriend with physical harm if she
reported his numerous instances of domestic violence against her to the police).
In other cases, especially those arising in neighborhoods with significant gang or drug-
selling activity, people who witnessed a crime, or who might otherwise have relevant
information concerning a crime, might not step forward and convey that information to
the police, not because of an explicit threat, but rather because of their general fear of
retaliation by those involved in the crime or their cohorts. This fear may stem from "a
real but unexpressed (or indirectly expressed) threat of harm to anyone who may
testify"-what has been called "implicit intimidation." FrNN & HEALEY, supra, at 2. For
example, three players may be killed in a drug-related shooting at a softball game, yet,
although the killings occurred in full view of spectators, the police cannot find any
cooperative witnesses because those who witnessed the killings are frightened by a
history of violent gang retaliation against cooperating witnesses. Id. Alternatively, a
witness may not step forward to implicate an individual because of "misperceived
intimidation," that is, the witness may feel intimidated even though "no actual danger"
exists, such as "when the [individual] and his associates do not have a history of violence."
Id. See generally id. at 1-9; KELLY DEDEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WITNESS INTIMIDATIONS
20, (2006), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdfltem=1762; ROGER TARLING ET.
AL., HOME OFFICE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, VICTIM AND
WITNESS INTIMIDATION: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE BRITISH CRIME SURVEY (2000),
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/rl 24.pdf.
3. See, e.g., In re Kronenberg, 117 P.3d 1134, 1136-37, 1141 (Wash. 2005)
(disbarring attorney who, while representing an individual charged with the rape of a
child, unsuccessfully attempted to procure the absence of the victim of the alleged
offense-the government's principal witness-by paying him money and buying him an
airplane ticket in exchange for his leaving the state and not testifying at the rape trial);
see also United States v. Gammarano, No. CR-06-0072 (CPS), 2007 WL 2077735, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2007) (discussing a case in which an alleged victim of loansharking
219
Alternatively, the defendant might try to persuade an individual to provide a
false alibi4 or to fabricate a story explaining away incriminating evidence.5
In a jury trial, the defendant may offer to pay,6 attempt to intimidate,7 or
left the country after one of the defendants in the loansharking trial who was a member
of an organized crime family visited him and told him that if he were called as a witness,
he should testify that the loan he received was not from the defendants); Boulton, [2007]
EWCA (Crim) 942 at [6], [7], [26]-[29], [36]-[37] (the alleged victim failed to appear at
trial to testify against an individual charged with, inter alia, rape and false imprisonment,
because of threats against her made by that individual).
4. E.g., R v. Saxena, [1999] 1 Cr. App. R(S) 170, 171 (Eng.) (before his trial for
failing to report a motor vehicle accident and other traffic offenses, a prison doctor
approached a colleague and offered to pay her £200 if she would write a note saying that
he had not left the prison on the date of the accident, and then, following his conviction,
he offered his colleague money and a trip to India if she would give evidence in his favor
at the hearing on his appeal); see also R v. Yates, [1989] 11 Cr. App. R(S) 451, 452
(Eng.) (for no apparent reason, an individual gave perjured testimony to support the alibi
defense of two men charged with, and ultimately convicted of, robbery).
5. E.g., The Queen v. Moore, [1999] N.Z.C.A. 274 (C.A.) (discussed infra text
accompanying notes 20-33), available at http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZCA/1999/ 274.hnl.
6. E.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 294-96, 295 n.1, 296 n.3 (1966) (a
labor union leader and two others were convicted for endeavoring to bribe two jurors at
the union leader's previous trial for violating a labor law); United States v. Magluta, 418
F.3d 1166, 1177, 1179 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (an individual being tried for numerous drug
offenses bribed the jury foreman, but his conviction for obstruction of justice through
jury bribery was reversed because it was based on inadmissible hearsay); United States
v. Washington, 66 F.3d 1101, 1102 (9th Cir. 1995) (an individual charged with drug
offenses bribed a juror and secured a hung jury); United States v. Radonjich, 1 F.3d 117,
119 (2d Cir. 1993) (an individual who had served on the jury in the trial of the reputed
leader of an organized crime family was convicted of participating in a scheme to accept
money in exchange for voting to acquit and influencing other jurors to do the same);
Magluta v. Samples, No. Civ.A. 1:94CV2700-TWT, 2006 WL 1071844, at *1 (N.D. Ga.,
Apr. 20, 2006) (stating that the plaintiff in a damage suit against federal prison officials
previously had been acquitted of various drug offenses and that three jurors at his trial
"were subsequently convicted of taking bribes to throw the case"); Commonwealth v.
Gallarelli, 362 N.E.2d 923, 924-25 (Mass. 1977) (two individuals were convicted for
endeavoring to bribe a juror in their previous trial for disseminating obscene films); R ex
rel. Lipinski v. Wolverhampton Crown Court, [2005] EWHC (Admin) 1950, [4], [23]-
[25], [28]-[32] (Eng.) (refusing to grant bail to two individuals charged with fraud,
because of substantial evidence of their involvement in an unsuccessful attempt to bribe
a juror in their trial); R v. Boodhoo, [2001] EWCA (Crim) 1027, [2]-[3], [2002] 1 Cr.
App. R(S) 9, at 34 (an individual who had served as a juror in a criminal trial pleaded
guilty to accepting £1000 from one of the defendants in that trial); R v. Allan, [2001]
EWCA (Crim) 1027, [1], [3]-[4], [6]-[7], [10]-[14], [19], [2002] 1 Cr. App. R(S) 9
(Eng.) (two individuals were convicted of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by
bribing a juror in their previous trial for conspiracy to supply illegal drugs); Stewart v.
H.M. Advocate, [1980] J.C. 103, 104, 106 (Scot.) (during the trial of three individuals
for various corruption offenses, a juror informed the judge that a man claiming to be the
brother of one of the defendants offered her £5000 if she would agree to try to persuade
the jury to return verdicts of not guilty).
7. State v. Melechinsky, 451 A,2d 585, 586 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982) (an individual
was convicted of six counts of attempting to tamper with a juror for mailing coercive
materials concerning the charges against him in a trial for driving with a suspended
license); R v. Wareing, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 2371, [1], [2], [11] (Eng.) (an individual
was convicted of perverting the course of justice for approaching a juror in his trial for
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otherwise influence8 one or more of the jurors to vote to acquit regardless of
the evidence. 9 The defendant may go so far as to proffer a bribe to the
trial judge for a directed verdict of not guilty or its functional equivalent.' °
Similarly, in a bench trial, the accused, or someone acting on his behalf,
might attempt to bribe the trial judge for an acquittal.' 1 Indeed, some have
harassment and saying "This case is a load of shit"); R v. Baxter, [2002] EWCA (Crim)
1516, [2], [6], [10], [2003] 1 Cr. App. R(S) 50, at 242, 245 (Eng.) (reducing the sentence
of an individual who, at the end of the first day of his brother's trial for aggravated
burglary, followed one the jurors in his car for a considerable distance); R v. Goult,
[1983] Crim. App. 140, 143-44 (Eng.) (an individual was convicted of contempt based
upon three separate instances of threatening jurors in the trial of two of his acquaintances
for stealing from and deceiving some elderly people).
8. United States v. Williams, 935 F.2d 1531, 1533 (8th Cir. 1991) (an individual
was convicted of jury tampering for having a third person contact two jurors in his
previous trial and attempting to influence them on his behalf); United States v. Forrest,
623 F.2d 1107, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1980) (an individual was convicted of jury tampering
for having a third person tell one of the jurors in their previous trial that the individual
and his wife were "good people"); R v. Mitchell-Crinkley, [1998] 1 Cr. App. R(S) 368,
369 (Eng.) (an individual was convicted of contempt of court for telephoning a juror in
his friend's trial and telling the juror that his friend's previous trial had resulted in a hung
jury). See also State v. Bowers, 241 S.E.2d 409, 410, 411, 412-13 (S.C. 1978) (an
individual was convicted of contempt of court for telephoning two prospective jurors in a
case involving his friend and discussing the case with them in an attempt to influence
them improperly in their deliberations).
9. The court in R v. Comerford, [1998] 1 All E.R. 823, 827 (C.A.) (Eng.), pointed
out that "[t]rial by jury inevitably carries with it the risk that an attempt may be made to
pervert the course of justice by trying to influence jurors, be it by bribery, intimidation or
otherwise." (internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Forrest, 620
F.2d 446, 458 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The possibility of attempts at jury tampering are ever
present."). In the United Kingdom, such attempts are generally known by the catchy
phrase "jury nobbling." Comerford, [1998] 1 All E.R. at 827. In the United States, such
conduct is often referred to as "jury tampering." Forrest, 620 F.2d at 458.
10. E.g., State v. McGettrick, 531 N.E.2d 755, 757, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (a
judge pleaded no contest to an indictment charging him with accepting a bribe in a jury
trial in which he entered a judgment of acquittal).
11. E.g., Aleman v. Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138
F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming the denial of habeas corpus relief to an individual
being retried for murder following his acquittal in a bench trial conducted before a judge
whom he bribed), aff'g sub nom. United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of Cook
County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. 111. 1997); United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 650
(7th Cir. 1995) (affirming the conviction of a judge for various offenses in connection
with his taking bribes, inter alia, to acquit individuals in bench trials); Bridges v. United
States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1191 (7th Cir. 1986) (the petitioner in an action to vacate his
convictions and sentence for drug offenses admitted that in a previous state prosecution
for murder, he bribed the trial judge to acquit him in a bench trial); United States v.
Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1525, 1527 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming the conviction of a judge
for various offenses in connection with his taking bribes, inter alia, to acquit individuals
in bench trials); People v. Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d 999, 1001-02, 1008-09 (Ill. 1998) (a
street gang supplied the money used in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to bribe the
gone so far as to kill a potential government witness to prevent adverse
testimony at trial.'
2
While a considerable number of defendants, or individuals acting on
their behalf, attempt to tamper with the criminal justice system, especially by
intimidating witnesses 13 or jurors,' 4 there is little reason to believe that
judge in a bench trial to acquit two of its members who were charged with murder);
People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that an individual
previously acquitted of murder in a bench trial could be retried for the same offense
because he had obtained the acquittal by bribing the trial judge), aff'g Nos. 93 CR 28786,
93 CR 28787, 1994 WL 684499 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 12, 1994) (interim ruling on
defendant's motion to dismiss indictments); see also United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d
581, 583-85 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming the conviction of a judge for taking bribes and for
the corruption of his judicial office in cases in which he granted one individual early
discharge from probation, dismissed the charges against another individual on speedy
trial grounds, and granted a third individual a new trial after initially convicting him of
two lesser-included felonies in a bench trial); People v. Incerto, 505 P.2d 1309, 1310,
1312 (Colo. 1973) (affirming the conviction of an individual for conspiring with a
defendant charged with a narcotics offense to bribe the trial judge to grant the defendant
probation).
The case of Harry Aleman, a reputed "hit man" for the Chicago mob who was retried
for murder following his acquittal in a bench trial by a judge he allegedly bribed, is
discussed infra text accompanying notes 260-80.
12. E.g., United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding the
conviction of an individual for violating the federal witness-tampering statute by
murdering a government informant who was scheduled to testify the next day in the drug
trafficking trial of the individual's brother); United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1347
(3d Cir. 1997) (upholding the conviction of a woman for various federal offenses relating
to the murder of a government informant who was scheduled to testify the next day in
the drug trafficking trial of the woman's boyfriend); News Release, U.S. Attorney's
Office, Dist. of Mass., Burlington Man Convicted in 1996 Killing of Medford Woman,
(Mar. 20, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/bostonO32006.html (announcing
that an individual had been convicted of the witness-tampering murder of a young
woman for ordering her killing so she could not be a witness against him and his criminal
associates in their trial for various offenses); see also United States v. DeCologero, No. 01-
10373-RWZ, 2003 WL 1538433, at *2 (D. Mass., Mar. 21, 2003) ("[T]he government
alleges that ... the [DeCologero] Crew first attempted to keep [a young woman] away
from authorities and then murdered her to prevent her from becoming a witness against
the Crew."), affd, 364 F.3d 12, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The government alleged that
DeCologero headed a criminal enterprise ... that used brutal tactics to gain control of a
portion of Boston's drug trade and murdered a nineteen-year-old woman.., when the
members thought she might betray them."); Accused Rapist Allegedly Kills Victim to
Silence Her, CNN, Mar. 21, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/ 2007/US/03/21/victim.killed.ap/
index.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (reporting that a man charged with rape was
charged with killing the rape victim because she had agreed to testify against him).
13. R v. Goodman, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 736, [11] (Eng.) ("The intimidation
of witnesses is, regrettably, a prevalent.., offence."); R v. Vincent D, [2004] EWCA
(Crim) 1271, [15] (Eng.) ("Intimidation of... witnesses is a growing problem generally
in criminal cases."); In re Attorney General's Reference (No. 1 of 2004), [2004] EWCA
(Crim) 1025, [147], [2004] 2 Crim. App. 27, at 465 (Eng.) ("It is the experience of all the
members of the court that [wimess] intimidation has in the recent past substantially
increased and continues to do so."); R v. Haslam, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 3444, [1] (Eng.)
("The disruption of trials including the intimidation of.. . witnesses is becoming an
extremely serious and disturbing problem for courts up and down the country."); DEDEL,
supra note 2, at 4-5 ("The prevalence of witness intimidation is difficult to quantify ....
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more than a handful of defendants succeed in their efforts,' 5 either by
That said, small-scale studies and surveys of police and prosecutors suggest that witness
intimidation is pervasive .... ); FINN & HEALEY, supra note 2, at 4 ("No one knows the
precise extent of witness intimidation because only limited scientific research has been
conducted on the problem. However, most of the prosecutors, police officers, judges,
and victim advocates interviewed for this report agreed that witness intimidation is
widespread [and] that it is increasing ...." (footnote omitted)); id. ("A 1990 study...
found that 36 percent of victims and witnesses interviewed in the Bronx Criminal Court
in 1988 had been threatened ... " (citing Robert C. Davis, Barbara E. Smith & Madeline
Henley, Victim/Witness Intimidation in the Bronx Courts: How Common Is It, and What
Are Its Consequences?, CENTER FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING, (1990), http://popcenter.
org/problems/witnessintimidation/PDFs/Davis etal_1990.pdf)); id. at 5 ("[M]ost criminal
justice system professionals report that witness intimidation ... is a serious [problem].");
id. at 9 ("Witness intimidation is a pervasive and insidious problem."); TARLING ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 2 (reporting that in the 1998 British Crime Survey of households, 390
criminal incidents, representing 8% of all incidents, led to victim intimidation); Richard
Ford, Judge Sounds Alarm Over Intimidation of Trial Witnesses, TIMES (London), Aug.
23, 1993, at 3 ("Criminals are intimidating increasing numbers of people to stop them
giving evidence or to change their stories in the witness box, according to one of
Britain's senior judges."), available at 1993 WLNR 3868994; but see FINN & HEALEY,
supra note 2, at 2 (quoting an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia, Superior Court Division, as stating that "[o]ccasionally there is actual witness
intimidation" (emphasis added)); TARLING ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 ("Indications from
the [1998 British Crime Survey] are that intimidation is not widespread .... Out of over
7,000 people questioned in 1998, only 191 incidents of harassment were uncovered-
affecting 164 witnesses. Of those who witnessed an act of vandalism, a car crime, or a
serious fight or assault, only 8% experienced harassment ...."); see also FINN &
HEALEY, supra note 2, at 2 ("Many of the prosecutors and police inspectors contacted for
this study reported that, as bad as intimidation may be, the public often overestimates
both its likelihood and the danger it represents."); DEDEL, supra note 2, at 6 ("[T]he
public tends to overestimate the actual risk of harm ....").
Unfortunately, studies attempting to measure the degree of witness intimidation tend
not to distinguish between, on the one hand, cases in which the intimidation was by, or
on behalf of, an individual already formally charged with a crime, i.e., a criminal
defendant, and, on the other hand, those in which the intimidation was by, or on behalf
of, an individual whose alleged crime had not yet been reported to police or who was
merely under arrest for, or suspected of being the perpetrator of, an offense.
14. Vincent D, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1271, [15] ("Intimidation of juries... is a
growing problem generally in criminal cases."); Attorney General's Reference, [2004]
EWCA (Crim) 1025, [147], [2004] 2 Crim. App. 27, at 465 ("It is the experience of all
the members of the court that [jury] intimidation has in the recent past substantially
increased and continues to do so."); Haslam, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 3444, [1] ("The
disruption of trials including the intimidation of jurors.., is becoming a serious and
disturbing problem for courts up and down the country."); How Criminals "Fix" Juries,
TIMES (London), Nov. 17, 1987 ("Jury nobbling has become big business, with organized
gangs specializing in fixing trials for big-time criminals .... Scotland Yard sources
suspect that big-time criminals--drug traffickers, armed robbers, fraudsters-have paid
millions to nobblers."), available at 1987 WLNR 1294944; but see Comerford, [1998] 1
All E.R. at 827 ("Intimidation... ofjurors is fortunately unusual.").
15. But see JAMES TUOHY & ROB WARDEN, GREYLORD: JUSTICE, CHICAGO STYLE
having the charges against them dropped 6 or dismissed before trial,' 7 or
by obtaining an unwarranted acquittal.' 8 Nevertheless, in those rare
(1989) (reporting on a United States Government investigation leading to the conviction
of numerous state court judges for, inter alia, taking bribes to fix cases being tried before
them, some of which involved criminal or quasi-criminal offenses); see also FINN &
HEALEY, supra note 2, at 4 ("[M]ost of the prosecutors, police officers, judges, and
victim advocates interviewed for this report agreed that witness intimidation...
seriously affects the prosecution of violent crimes."); How Criminals "Fix" Juries,
supra note 14 (reporting that "police chiefs believe that villains have walked free after
nobblers succeeded in intimidating or corrupting jurors in... trials").
16. The government is likely to drop a charge before trial when it believes that in
light of the changed circumstances, such as an absent witness, a witness' new version of
the events, or the sudden appearance of an alibi witness, it will be unable to prove the
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard of proof required in a criminal
case in both the United States, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required in criminal prosecutions),
and England, Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] A.C. 462, 481-82 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 42-43 (2d ed. 1983),
as well as in other common law jurisdictions, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341, at 571
(Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) ("[The standard of proof] 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' . . . is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by
which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.").
See DEDEL, supra note 2, at 6 ("Witness intimidation deprives investigators and prosecutors
of critical evidence, often.., causing cases to be abandoned .... ").
When one whose crime has not yet been reported to the police succeeds in tampering
with the criminal justice system so that authorities never learn of his crime, see supra
note 2, a formal charge will never be brought against him for that offense. Similarly,
when an arrestee or a suspect, or someone acting on his behalf, succeeds in tampering
with the system, see supra note 2, the government may forgo bringing a formal charge
against him. See DEDEL, supra note 2, at 6 ("Witness intimidation deprives investigators
and prosecutors of critical evidence, often preventing suspects from being charged .... ").
17. See United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 584 (2d Cir. 1986) (in exchange
for bribes, a judge dismissed the charges against one defendant on speedy trial grounds,
and suppressed identification evidence linking another defendant to a robbery, which led
to the dismissal of the indictment against this second defendant).
18. See Smith v. Williams, No. 05C-10-307-PLA, 2007 WL 2193748, at *4 (Del.
Super. Ct., July 27, 2007) (asserting that "cases involving ... bribery of ajudge or juror" are
"fortunately rare"); Comerford, [1998] 1 All E.R. at 837 ("Intimidation or bribery of
jurors is fortunately unusual."). The Author takes the statements made by these courts to
mean that efforts to bribe or intimidate witnesses, jurors, or judges are rarely successful.
The Author's research of reported decisions in the United States produced only a
handful of recent cases in which improper conduct by a criminal defendant, or someone
acting on his behalf, resulted in an acquittal. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166,
1173, 1177, 1179 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (an individual charged with numerous drug offenses
bribed the jury foreman and was acquitted of those offenses, but his conviction for
obstruction of justice through juror bribery was reversed on appeal because it was based
on inadmissible hearsay); Aleman v. Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, 138 F.3d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming the denial of habeas corpus relief
to an individual being retried for murder following his acquittal in a bench trial by a
judge whom he bribed), affg sub nom. United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of
Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (N.D. I11. 1997); United States v. Maloney, 71
F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming the conviction of a judge for various offenses in
connection with his taking bribes, inter alia, to acquit individuals in bench trials); United
States v. Radonjich, 1 F.3d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 1993) (an individual who served on the jury
in the trial of the reputed leader of an organized crime family and several co-defendants
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participated in a scheme to accept money in exchange for voting to acquit and
influencing other jurors to do the same); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1191
(7th Cir. 1986) (petitioner in an action to vacate his conviction and sentences for various
drug offenses admitted that in a previous prosecution for murder he bribed the judge in a
bench trial to acquit him); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1525, 1527 (7th Cir.
1985) (affirming the conviction of a judge for various offenses in connection with his
taking bribes, inter alia, to acquit individuals in bench trials); Magluta v. Samples, No.
Civ. A. I:94CV2700-TWT, 2006 WL 1071844, at *1 (N.D. Ga., Apr. 20, 2006) (stating
that the plaintiff previously had been acquitted of various drug offenses and that three
jurors at his trial "were subsequently convicted of taking bribes to throw the case" in an
action for damages against federal prison officials); People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that an individual previously acquitted of murder in a bench
trial could be retried for the same offense because he had obtained the acquittal by
bribing the trial judge), affig Nos. 93 CR 28786, 93 CR 28787, 1994 WL 684499 (Il1.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 12, 1994) (interim ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss indictments);
State v. McGettrick, 531 N.E.2d 755, 757, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (a judge pleaded no
contest to an indictment charging him with accepting a bribe in a jury trial in which he
entered a judgment of acquittal); see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 901-02
(1997) (noting that before being appointed to the bench, a trial judge convicted of fixing
a murder case was a criminal defense attorney with close ties to organized crime who
"often paid off judges in criminal cases"); TuoHY & WARDEN, supra note 15 (reporting on
an investigation by the United States Government that led to the conviction of numerous
state court judges for, inter alia, taking bribes to fix cases being tried before them). One
would think that prosecutors would be deeply concerned about acquittals resulting from
the intimidation or bribery of witnesses, jurors, and judges, and would vigorously pursue
those responsible. The dearth of recent cases involving such situations leads the Author
to conclude that very few acquittals in the United States result from such improper
conduct.
The Author's research of reported decisions in the United Kingdom yielded a similar
result. The Author found only two recent cases in which a person was convicted of an
offense relating to the intimidation of either a witness or a juror in a trial for a separate
crime that resulted in the defendant's acquittal of that separate crime, R v. Wareing,
[2005] EWCA (Crim) 2371, [1], [2], [11] (Eng.); R v. Allan, [2001] EWCA (Crim)
1027, [1], [3]-[4], [6]-[7], [10]-[14], [19], [89], [2002] 1 Cr. App. R(S) 9 (Eng.) (in the
appeal by two individuals of their convictions for conspiring to pervert the course of
justice by bribing a juror in their previous trial for conspiracy to supply illegal drugs, the
court stated that a co-defendant in the drug conspiracy trial had been acquitted of that
charge and had pleaded guilty to doing acts to pervert the course ofjustice); see also R v.
Boodhoo, [2001] EWCA (Crim) 1027, [2]-[3], [2002] 1 Cr. App. R(S) 9, at 34 (the juror
in the criminal trial involving Allan pleaded guilty to having accepted £ 1000 from one of
the defendants in that trial), and even in one of those cases, the acquittal was an indirect
result of the improper conduct. Wareing, [2005] EWCA (Crim).2371, [1], [2], [11] (an
individual was convicted of perverting the course ofjustice for approaching a juror in his
trial for harassment and saying "'This case is load of shit,"' an act that led the trial judge
to discharge the jury and to an acquittal when the prosecution offered no evidence in the
retrial because the complainant refused to attend court to give evidence a second time).
Moreover, although the "tainted acquittal" provisions of the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996 apply to offenses committed after April 15, 1997, in England,
Scotland, and Wales, and after June 30, 1997, in Northern Ireland, see infra note 44, the
High Court has never exercised its power to quash an acquittal on the ground that the
acquittal was "tainted" by "an administration of justice offence involving interference
instances in which a defendant obtains an acquittal by unlawful means,
the traditional Anglo-American rule against double jeopardy is an absolute
bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, thereby preventing
the government from bringing a criminal to book. For, even if the
government subsequently discovers the acquittal resulted from improper
conduct, double jeopardy prevents the government from retrying the
acquitted defendant. 19
A New Zealand case illustrates this point. In 1991, the government
charged Kevin Moore, 20 a member of a New Plymouth gang,21 with the
with or intimidation of a juror or a witness." Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act,
1996, c. 25, § 54(1)(b) (Eng.); LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 158:
PROSECUTION APPEALS AGAINST JUDGES' RULINGS 2.26 (2000) [hereinafter ENGLISH
LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 158] ("The procedure [established by the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 to quash a tainted acquittal] has never
been uscd."); Interview with Ian D. Brownlee, Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Directorate,
Crown Prosecution Serv., in London, Eng. (Mar. 29, 2007).
A defendant may sometimes succeed in securing a hung jury by bribing or
intimidating a juror into voting for his acquittal, e.g., United States v. Washington, 66
F.3d 1101, 1102 (9th Cir. 1995), but the traditional rule against double jeopardy, as
applied in both the United States and England, does not preclude a retrial of a defendant
for the same offense following trial in which the jury is unable to reach a verdict. United
States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254,
1305-06 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); DAVID S. RUDSTEN, DOUBLE JEOPARDY
140 (2004); ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE §§ 4-117, 4-262,
4-440 (P.J. Richardson ed., 2006) [hereinafter ARCHBOLD]; ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION,
REPORT No. 267: DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND PROSECUTION APPEALS 2.2, 2.47 (2001)
[hereinafter ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267]; WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at
164.
19. For a statement of the traditional rule against double jeopardy, see infra text
accompanying notes 62-67 and infra note 72.
Of course, if the government dropped the charge against the accused prior to the
commencement of trial because it did not believe it could meet its burden of proof, see
supra note 16, or the trial court dismissed the charge before the start of trial, the
traditional rule against double jeopardy would not preclude the government from re-
prosecuting the accused for the same offense. In the United States, a person is placed in
"jeopardy" (i.e., jeopardy "attaches") only when he is "put to trial before the trier of the
facts," Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975) (quoting United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)) (holding that the Government could appeal
the trial court's dismissal of an indictment charging the defendant with willfully failing
to report for and submit to induction into the Armed Forces because the Double Jeopardy
Clause would not bar the Government from trying the defendant if the appellate court
reversed the dismissal), which occurs in a jury trial when the jury has been selected and
sworn, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36-38 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977), and in a bench trial when the judge begins to hear
evidence, Crist, 437 U.S. at 37 n.15; Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 27 n.3 (1977);
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 569; Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388, and in England, the
protection afforded by the autrefois rule, see infra text accompanying notes 62-67,
applies only following an acquittal or a conviction. Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1305-06;
ARCHBOLD, supra note 18, § 4-117; ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra
note 18, IT 2.2, 2.47; WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 164.
20. See The Queen v. Moore, [1999] N.Z.C.A. 274 (C.A.), available at http://www.
nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZCA/1999/274.html; NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY
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murder of Robert Jillings, a member of a rival gang,22 who had been
stabbed to death.23 Investigators discovered Moore's fresh fingerprints at
a house in which Jillings had been residing shortly before his death.24 At
Moore's 1992 trial, an individual named Mackie testified for the defense,
stating that two months before Jillings was killed he had accompanied
Moore to Jillings' house to engage in a drug deal, 5 thereby explaining
the presence of Moore's fingerprints at Jillings' residence. Moore was
acquitted of murdering Jillings.26 Four years later, Mackie, a member of
the same gang as Moore, confessed to the police that he had committed
perjury at Moore's trial when he testified concerning the fingerprint
27
evidence. He explained that while incarcerated in the same prison in
which Moore was being detained while awaiting trial, he and Moore had
agreed that Mackie would lie to explain away the crucial fingerprint
evidence. 28 Despite this revelation by Mackie, the rule against double
jeopardy precluded the government from retrying Moore for the murder
of Jillings. 9 Unable to charge Moore with murder, the government instead
charged him with conspiring with Mackie to pervert the course of
justice.30 In 1999,3 1 a jury convicted Moore of that offense, and a judge
sentenced him to the maximum penalty permitted for the offense: seven
years' imprisonment. 32 However, had Moore been tried and convicted
PAPER 42: ACQUITTAL FOLLOWING PERVERSION OF THE COURSE OF JUSTICE: A RESPONSE
TO R V MOORE 1 (2000) [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY
PAPER 42].
21. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY PAPER 42, supra note 20, 1.
22. Id.
23. Moore, [1999] N.Z.C.A. 274 (C.A.), [2].
24. Id.
25. Id. at [3].
26. Id.
27. Id. at [4].
28. Id.
29. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY PAPER 42, supra note 20, 4.
30. Moore, [1999] N.Z.C.A. 274 (C.A.), [5]. The government charged Moore with
violating section 116 of The Crimes Act 1961, which provides: "Every one is liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years who conspires to obstruct, prevent,
pervert, or defeat the course of justice in New Zealand or the course of justice in an
overseas jurisdiction." Crimes Act 1961, § 116, 1961 S.N.Z. No. 43.
31. Moore initially was tried and convicted in 1998, receiving a sentence of five
years' imprisonment, but the Court of Appeal quashed his conviction and ordered a
retrial because of prejudice to his defense occasioned by the trial court's refusal to sever
his trial from that of a co-defendant charged with the murder of Jillings. R v. Moore,
[1999] 3 N.Z.L.R. 385 (C.A.).
32. Moore, [1999] N.Z.C.A. 274 (C.A.), [1], [6]. When imposing the sentence, the
trial judge stated:
of murder, he would have been subject to a much greater sentence: a
minimum non-parole period of ten years' imprisonment and a maximum
term of life imprisonment.
33
In an attempt to avoid such a result in the United Kingdom, Parliament
enacted a statute in 1996 intended to limit the double jeopardy bar in
some situations in which the defendant obtained an acquittal through
improper means, thereby permitting the government to retry the person
for the same offense 34 of which he previously was tried and acquitted.
35
The statute, part of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996,
allows a retrial when an individual's acquittal was "tainted," which,
under the statute, means an acquittal resulting from interference with, or
intimidation of, a juror, witness, or potential witness.36 In allowing a
A conspiracy to [per]vert the course of justice to avoid your rightful conviction
for murder and a life sentence of imprisonment must be as serious as any that
could be committed. It must call for a deterrent sentence. Even the maximum
sentence of seven years imprisonment for the conspiracy cannot act as an
appropriate deterrent for your crime as in all respects it is substantially less
than the sentence you would otherwise have received. That maximum sentence is
an encouragement to offenders like you to commit the type of conspiracy you
committed. The law does not permit you to be retried for the murder you
committed as you were acquitted of it because of your conspiracy. You escape
the sentence of life imprisonment that should be the minimum you receive.
Instead you receive a much lesser sentence... The maximum of seven years
imprisonment is itself a very lenient sentence in your case when by your
conspiracy you have literally got away with murder and avoided life
imprisonment. To impose any lesser sentence would further benefit you in
respect of the crime of conspiracy committed by you.
NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY PAPER 42, supra note 20, T I (quoting
The Queen v. Moore, No. T31/99, at 3-5 (High Court, Palmerston North Registry Sept.
17, 1999) (unreported)). The Court of Appeal subsequently found the sentence justified
and dismissed Moore's appeal of the sentence. Moore, [1999] N.Z.C.A. 274 (C.A.),
[15]. In doing so, it stated that Moore's offense "falls squarely within the band or
bracket comprising the worst class of cases under [the conspiracy to defeat justice]
section [of the Crimes Act 1961] and therefore qualifies for the maximum term." Id.
33. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY PAPER 42, supra note 20, 1.
34. The statute, of course, uses the English spelling of the word "offense"--
offence. In this Article, the Author will use the American spelling, except when quoting
material using the English spelling. The Author will do the same for any other words
that differ in their English and American spellings.
35. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54-57 (Eng.).
The tainted acquittal provision was first proposed in 1993 as part of a more general
effort by Britain's Conservative government to respond to the public's concern about
crime. Kevin Brown, The Conservative Party Conference: Howard Aims to Curb "Tidal
Wave" of Crime, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1993, at 10.
36. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54 (Eng.). The statute
sets forth detailed requirements that must be met before the second trial can take place.
See infra text accompanying notes 43-61. The statute applies in England, Wales, Northern
Ireland, and Scotland. See Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (Appointed
Day No. 4) Order 1997, art. 2 (Eng.); Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996
(Appointed Day No. 5) Order 1997, art. 2 (Eng). Nevertheless, for the sake of
convenience, the Author normally will refer only to England when discussing the statute
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retrial in such circumstances, the statute creates an exception to the
traditional English rule against double jeopardy. The plea of autrefois
acquit,37 a former acquittal, provides that once an individual is found not
guilty of an offense he cannot be tried again for the same offense.38 This
Article analyzes this statute in light of the policies underlying the protection
against double jeopardy in an effort to determine whether Parliament
acted wisely when it created this "tainted acquittal" exception to the rule
against double jeopardy. The issue is both timely and important due to
and the rule against double jeopardy. It should be noted, however, that Scotland has its
own rule against double jeopardy, albeit one that is "broadly similar to that in England
and Wales." ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156: DOUBLE JEOPARDY,
app. B, B.22 (1999) [hereinafter ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO.
156].
37. The plea, expressed in Norman-French, is spelled in various ways, including
autrefoits acquit, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *335-36, and auterfoits
acquit, e.g., Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254, 1306-07 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 530 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). This Article will use the spelling autrefois
acquit, except when quoting from material using an alternative spelling.
38. For a statement of the traditional English rule against double jeopardy, see
infra text accompanying notes 62-67.
A statute enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament prior to the passage of the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 allows the government to appeal an
acquittal rendered in a magistrate's court by way of case stated, and if successful, to retry
the individual for the same offense. Such an appeal, however, is limited to a claim that
the verdict was either "wrong in law" or "in excess ofjurisdiction." Magistrates' Courts
Act, 1980, c. 43, § 111(1) (Eng.); e.g., DPP v. Milton, [2006] EWHC (Admin) 242, 2006
R.T.R. 21 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (allowing the government's appeal of a police officer's acquittal
for driving dangerously, and remitting the case to the Magistrate's Court for a rehearing
by a differently constituted tribunal). Since the enactment of the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996, Parliament has enacted two additional exceptions to the
traditional rule against double jeopardy. The first, enacted in 2003, Criminal Justice Act,
2003, c. 44, §§ 75-86 (Eng.), allows the government, under certain circumstances, to
retry a previously-acquitted individual for certain serious offenses when "there is new
and compelling evidence against the acquitted person." Id. § 78. The second, also enacted in
2003, Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 57-61, 67-74, grants the government the
right to appeal to the Court of Appeal certain rulings of a trial court, including a ruling
entered at the conclusion of the government's case in "a trial on indictment," id. § 57(1),
that "there is no case to answer," id. § 58(7)(a), i.e., a directed verdict of acquittal, see
JOHN SPRACK, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.48 (11 th ed.
2006), and provides that if the Court of Appeal reverses the trial court's ruling, it can
"order that the proceedings for [the] offence may be resumed," Criminal Justice Act,
2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(a) (Eng.), or "order that a fresh trial may take place... for [the
same] offence." Id. § 61(4)(b). The Author has previously written about the exception
for "new and compelling evidence," see David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in
England, Part I.- The Exception for "New and Compelling Evidence, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L.J. 387 (2007), and intends to focus upon the right of the government to appeal a
directed verdict of acquittal in a future article.
the ongoing movement in other common law jurisdictions, namely
Australia,3 9 New Zealand,40 and Jamaica,41 to create a similar exception
to the traditional double jeopardy principle. Indeed, in October 2006,
the legislature of New South Wales, Australia, enacted a statute creating
an exception to the rule against double jeopardy in instances where an
acquittal for a "very serious offence" was "tainted.
'A2
39. In 2003, the Model Criminal Code Officers' Committee of the Standing
Committee of Attorneys-General canvassed a number of options for reform of the rule
against double jeopardy at the federal level in Australia, including a procedure to allow
the government to retry a previously-acquitted individual for the same offense when the
acquittal appears to be "tainted." See MODEL CRIMINAL CODE OFFICERS' COMMITTEE OF
THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE ATTORNEYS-GENERAL, MODEL CRIMINAL CODE,
DISCUSSION PAPER, CHAPTER 2, ISSUE ESTOPPEL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND PROSECUTION
APPEALS AGAINST ACQUITTALS iv, 72-74 (2003) [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN MODEL
CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER]; see also Press Release, Commonwealth Minister of
Justice and Customs, Senator Chris Ellison, Double Jeopardy Reform Still on the Agenda,
(Mar. 22, 2004), http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/justiceministerHome.nsf/Page/Media
_Releases_20041 stQuarter 22 March_2004-Doublejeopardyreform still on the_
agenda ("[W]hilst some States and Territories [at the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General meeting late last week] disagreed with changing the double jeopardy rule in
relation to 'fresh and compelling' evidence, it was agreed that further work should be
done in relation to a 'tainted acquittal."').
40. Criminal Procedure Bill, 2004, 158-2, § 7, available at http://www.clerk.
parliament.govt.nz/en-NZ/PB/Legislation/Bills/ (follow "Criminal Procedure Bill"
hyperlink; then follow "Bill 158-2 [PDF 3721k] hyperlink). The Bill received its second
reading in Parliament on May 9, 2006, and was debated by a Committee of the Whole
House in March of 2007. See also NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70:
ACQUITTAL FOLLOWING PERVERSION OF THE COURSE OF JUSTICE (2001) vii, 37-48
(recommending an exception to the rule against double jeopardy when an individual
secured an apparently unmerited acquittal in certain serious cases by means of perjury or
other conduct aimed at defeating the course of justice) [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND LAW
COMMISSION, REPORT 70].
41. Barbara Gayle, Appeal Court Wants "Tainted Acquittal" Legislation, JAMAICA
GLEANER, Dec. 22, 2006, http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20061222/news/news7.html
(reporting that the Court of Appeal of Jamaica "called for urgent legislation to be passed
to deal with 'tainted acquittals' when it dismissed an appeal brought by Millicent Forbes,
mother of 13-year-old Janice Allen, who was seeking to have a jury's verdict [of acquittal]
quashed.").
42. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Amendment (Double Jeopardy) Act 2006,
http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/maintop/search/sessional (search title for exact words
"Crimes (Appeal and Review) Amendment (Double Jeopardy)" in 2006).
A bill to create a similar exception was introduced in the Queensland, Australia
Parliament in April of 2007. Criminal Code (Double Jeopardy) Amendment Bill 2007,
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/Bills/52PDF/2007/CrimCDJAmdBO7_P.pdf.
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I. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND INVESTIGATIONS ACT 1996
The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 permits the High
Court of Justice to quash an acquittal43 and authorizes the retrial of the
individual for the same offense of which she was acquitted." The High
Court can quash an acquittal only after "a person has been convicted of
an administration of justice offence involving interference with or
intimidation of a juror or a witness (or potential witness) in any proceedings
which led to the acquittal."" For these purposes, an "administration of
justice offence[]" comprises the following offenses: "perverting the
course of justice, ' 46 intimidating a witness, potential witness, or juror, in
43. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(3) (Eng.).
44. Id. § 54(4). In England, Wales, and Scotland, the statute applies to acquittals
of offenses allegedly committed on or after April 15, 1997. Id. § 54(7)-(8); Criminal
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (Appointed Day No. 4) Order 1997, art. 2 (Eng.).
In Northern Ireland, it applies to acquittals for offenses allegedly committed on or after
June 30, 1997. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(7)-(8)
(Eng.); Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (Appointed Day No. 5) Order
1997, art. 2 (Eng).
45. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(l)(b) (Eng.).
46. Id. § 54(6)(a). "Perverting the course of justice" is a common law offense,
e.g., R v. Cotter, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 1033, [16], 2003 Q.B. 951, 957 (C.A.) (Eng.); R
v. Rafique, [1993] Q.B. 843, 849-50 (C.A.) (Eng,); R v. Vreones, [1891] 1 Q.B. 360, 366
(CCR) (Eng.); R v. Clark, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 991, [10], [2003] 2 Crim. App. 364,
366 (U.K.); R v. Andrews, [1973] Q.B. 422, 425 (C.A.) (Eng.); R v. Grimes [1968] 3 All
E.R. 179, 181 (Crown Ct.) (Eng.), that is committed when a person "(a) acts or embarks
upon a course of conduct, (b) which has a tendency to, and (c) is intended to pervert, (d)
the course of public justice," ARCHBOLD, supra note 18, § 28-1 (citing Vreones, [1891] 1
Q.B. at 369). The offense "covers a wide variety of situations," including "fabricating,
concealing or destroying evidence with intent to influence the outcome of criminal
proceedings." Clark, [2003] EWCA (Crim) at [10], [2003] 2 Crim. App. at 366 (Eng.). It
typically involves interference with a witness or potential witness by persuading the
individual to alter his or her evidence, see Grimes, [1968] 3 All E.R. at 181 (holding
valid an indictment charging an individual with attempting to defeat the course ofjustice
by inducing the victim of a theft to make a false report to the police that he had found in
his house monies he previously had reported stolen), or manufacturing false evidence,
see, e.g., Vreones, [1891] 1 Q.B. at 366-68 (Lord Coleridge, C.J.) (stating that it would
have been an offense if the representative of the seller of a cargo of wheat tampered with
samples of the wheat and used those samples to mislead an arbitration panel in a
proceeding to resolve a dispute between the buyer and seller concerning the quality of
the cargo of wheat and concluding that an attempt to pervert the course ofjustice in that
manner also constitutes an offense); Andrews, [1973] Q.B. at 425-26 (stating that
producing false evidence with a view to misleading a court and perverting the course of
justice constitutes an offense and that therefore an incitement to do so also constitutes an
offense; holding that a witness to an accident in which a car collided with a moped
was properly convicted for contacting the driver of the car, against whom criminal
violation of section 51 (1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of
1994; 47 and "aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring, suborning or inciting
another person" to commit perjury in violation of section 1 of the Perjury
Act 191 1.48 Moreover, the High Court can quash an acquittal only upon
the application of a prosecutor 49 and only after the court before which
the person was convicted of the "administration of justice offence" certifies
two things: 50 first, that there "appears" to be a "real possibility" that,
"but for the interference or intimidation" of the juror, witness, or potential
witness, the acquitted individual would not have been acquitted;51 and
second, that it would not be "contrary to the interests of justice,"
"because of lapse of time or for any other reason," to retry the acquitted
individual for the offense of which she was acquitted.52 Once the court
before which the person was convicted of the "administration of justice
offence" issues the certification,53 a prosecutor can apply to the High
proceedings were being instituted, and inviting him to make a payment to the witness in
exchange for the witness' making a false statement to the police relating to the accident).
The offense can also include such things as publishing matter calculated to prejudice the
fair trial of an individual in a pending case. See R v. Tibbits [1902] 1 K.B. 77, 88-89
(C.C.R.) (holding that a newspaper reporter and an editor of the newspaper could be
convicted of doing an act calculated to obstruct and pervert the due course of justice for
publishing articles containing statements highly detrimental to two defendants in a
pending criminal prosecution, many of which statements related to matters as to which
evidence would be inadmissible at trial). See generally ARCHBOLD, supra note 18, §§
28-1 to 28-25.
47. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(6)(b) (Eng.).
Section 5 1(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 provides:
A person commits an offence if-
(a) he does an act which intimidates, and is intended to intimidate, another
person ("the victim"),
(b) he does the act knowing or believing that the victim is assisting in the
investigation of an offence or is a witness or potential witness or a juror or
potential juror in proceedings for an offence, and
(c) he does it intending thereby to cause the investigation or the course of
justice to be obstructed, perverted or interfered with.
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 51(1) (Eng.).
48. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(6)(c) (Eng.).
Section 1 of the Perjury Act of 1911 provides:
If any person lawfully sworn as a witness or as an interpreter in a judicial
proceeding willfully makes a statement material in that proceeding, which he
knows to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be guilty of
perjury ....
Perjury Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 6, § 1 (Eng.).
49. See Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(3) (Eng.); see
also The Crown Prosecution Service, Re-trials, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legallsection15/
chapter b.html.
50. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(2)-(3) (Eng.).
51. Id. § 54(2)(a).
52. Id. § 54(2)(b), (5).
53. Where the court finds the two conditions mentioned in the text are met, it
"shall" issue the certification. Id. § 54(2).
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Court to quash the acquittal. Upon receiving such an application, the
High Court must quash the acquittal if, and only if, four conditions are
satisfied. 4 First, it must "appear[]... likely that, but for the interference or
intimidation, the acquitted person would not have been acquitted.,
55
Second, it must "not appear ... that, because of the lapse of time or
for any other reason, it would be contrary to the interests of justice" to
retry the acquitted individual for the offense of which she was acquitted.
5 6
Third, it must "appear[]" that the acquitted individual was "given a
reasonable opportunity to make written representations to the Court. 5 7
Fourth, it must "appear[]... that the conviction for the administration of
justice offence will stand."58 In making this latter determination, the High
Court must "take into account all the information before it,"' 59 but must
"ignore the possibility of new factors coming to light." 60 According to
the statute, this fourth condition prohibits the Court from quashing an
acquittal "if (for instance) it appears ... that any time allowed for giving
notice of appeal [of the administration of justice offence] has not expired
or that an appeal [of such conviction] is pending.'
III. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRINCIPLE
A. History
In his monumental treatise on the common law, published in four
volumes between 1765 and 1769, Sir William Blackstone described the
pleas of autrefois acquit (a former acquittal) and autrefois convict (a
former conviction).6 2 These special pleas in bar, he wrote, "give a reason
why the prisoner ought not to answer [the indictment] at all, nor put
himself upon his trial for the crime alleged." 63 Both pleas, he explained,
are based upon the "universal maxim of the common law of England
' 64
that "no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once
54. Id. § 54(3).
55. Id. § 55(1).
56. Id. § 55(2).
57. Id. § 55(3).
58. Id. § 55(4).
59. Id. § 55(5)(a).
60. Id. § 55(5)(b).
61. Id. § 55(6).
62. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *335-36.
63. Id. at *335.
64. Id.
for the same offence. 65 Thus, he concluded, "when a man is once fairly
found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution, before any
court having competent jurisdiction of the offence, he may plead such
acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime,, 66 and
similarly, when a person is convicted of a crime, he can plead that
conviction in bar of any subsequent accusation "for the same identical
crime. 67
Today, the principle that a person68 should not be tried twice for the
same offense, commonly called the protection against "double jeopardy"
in Anglo-American legal systems, is accepted not only in England,7 °
65. Id. With respect to the plea of autrefois convict, Blackstone wrote that this
plea is grounded upon the principle that "no man ought to be twice brought in danger of
his life for one and the same crime." Id. at *336 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at *335.
When Blackstone wrote his treatise, a statute existed allowing the wife or male heir of
a homicide victim to bring a private prosecution, known as an "appeal," against the
alleged killer despite that individual's previous acquittal in a prosecution brought by the
King for the same killing. 1487, 3 Hen. 7, c. I (Eng.). The statute was of little practical
significance, however, because by the early part of the eighteenth century prosecution by
appeal was "all but practically obsolete." 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 247 (London, MacMillan 1883); see also 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 37, at *312 (stating that prosecution by appeal is "very little in use").
Parliament formally abolished prosecution by appeal in 1819. 1819, 59 Geo. 3, c. 46
(Eng.).
67. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *336.
Today, in practice, second prosecutions are not brought in England and so do not reach
court, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THIRD REPORT, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
RULE 6 (2000), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm I99900/cmselect/
cmhaff/190/19003.htm [hereinafter SELECT COMMIrrEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THIRD REPORT];
see also Pearce v. The Queen (1998) 194 C.L.R. 610, 645 (Austl.) (Kirby, J.) ("Except
for accidental oversight or lack of coordination between prosecuting authorities, it is
virtually unthinkable that an accused would ever be charged with exactly the same
offense twice." (footnote omitted)); but see United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court
of Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (a local prosecutor in the
United States obtained a second indictment of an individual for the same murder of
which he previously was acquitted, claiming that the acquittal had been obtained by
bribing the judge in a bench trial), affd on other grounds sub nom. Aleman v. Honorable
Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998); People v.
Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615, 625-26 (I11. App. Ct. 1996) (same), unless the previous
acquittal was quashed, see R v. Dunlop, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1354 (Eng.) (quashing the
acquittal of William "Billy" Dunlop for the murder of Julie Hogg and allowing his retrial
for that crime on the basis of "new and compelling evidence"); The Crown Prosecution
Service, William Dunlop Pleads Guilty in First Double Jeopardy Case, Sept. 11, 2006
(announcing that prior to his retrial for the murder of Julie Hogg, William Dunlop
pleaded guilty to the crime), http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/pressreleases/archive/2006/152
06.html.'
68. At least in the United States, the rule against double jeopardy protects not only
individual human beings, but also corporations. See United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (per
curiam). This article uses the words "person" and "individual" interchangeably, with the
understanding that each term may encompass both natural persons and corporations.
69. English legal scholar Glanville Williams stated that because the doctrine applies
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but throughout the world.7' In the United States, for example, the Fifth
only when there has been an acquittal or a conviction, "the expression 'double jeopardy'...
is misleading for English law," for "[t]he defence is not given to a person merely because
he was previously at risk of being convicted." WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 164.
70. Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254, 1305-06 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.) (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest); ARCHBOLD, supra note 18, §§ 4-114, 4-116 to 4-
160; ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 1.14, 2.2, 2.6, 2.8;
see also 3 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 213-14 (London,
W. Lee & D. Parkman 1644); 2 MATTHEW HALE, [HISTORIA PLACITORIUM CORONAE]
THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *240-55; 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 368-79 (Arno Press 2d ed. 1972) (1726).
Today, of course, an individual whose previous acquittal was quashed pursuant to the
provisions of either the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 relating to
tainted acquittals, see supra text accompanying notes 43-61, or the Criminal Justice Act
2003 relating to "new and compelling evidence," see supra note 38, cannot plead autrefois
acquit; nor can one whose court-directed acquittal was reversed on appeal under either
the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 granting the government the right to
appeal a directed verdict of acquittal, see supra note 38, or the Magistrates' Courts Act
1980 allowing the government to appeal an acquittal rendered in a magistrate's court by
way of case stated. See supra note 38.
In addition to the autrefois rule, a special application of the "abuse of process" rules
provides protection against double jeopardy. Lord Devlin articulated the applicable
principle in Connelly:
As a general rule a judge should stay an indictment (that is, order that it remain
on the file not to be proceeded with) when he is satisfied that the charges
therein are founded on the same facts as the charges in a previous indictment
on which the accused has been tried, or form or are a part of a series of
offences of the same or a similar character as the offences charged in the
previous indictment. He will do this because as a general rule it is oppressive
to an accused for the prosecution not to [join the charges for trial in a single
proceeding] where it can properly [do so]. But a second trial on the same or
similar facts is not always and necessarily oppressive, and there may in a
particular case be special circumstances which make it just and convenient in
that case. The judge must then, in all the circumstances of the particular case,
exercise his discretion as to whether or not he applies the general rule.
Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1359-60; e.g., R v. Beedie, [1998] Q.B. 356, 356, 360-61, 366
(C.A.) (Eng.) (holding that although a landlord who previously had pleaded guilty to
summary offenses under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 arising from a
defective gas fire on his premises that resulted in the death of a resident from carbon
monoxide poisoning could not plead autrefois convict in a subsequent prosecution for
manslaughter because the two offenses were not the same, the manslaughter prosecution
should have been stayed); ENGLISH LAW COMMISsION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18,
2.14-2.19.
71. AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 39, at 1
n.5 (noting that the double jeopardy "principle stands in constitutional status in over 50
countries"); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:
Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National
Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 289, 289 n.262 (1993) (asserting that
"[t]he right to protection from double jeopardy and non bis in idem are found in over
fifty national constitutions," and listing those constitutional provisions); see also Bartkus
Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person shall ... be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb, 72 while in Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that
"[a]ny person charged with an offence has the right.., if finally acquitted
of the offence, not to be tried for it again, and if finally found guilty and
punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again. 73
Similarly, the Constitution of India provides: "No person shall be prosecuted
and punished for the same offence more than once."74 Most, if not all,
countries on the European continent recognize the principle of ne bis in
idem, 75 sometimes stated as non bis in idem, 76 which provides that a
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 154 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Today [the principle against double
jeopardy] is found, in varying forms, not only in the Federal Constitution, but in the
jurisprudence or constitutions of every State, as well as most foreign nations."); Gerald
Conway, Ne Bis in Idem in International Law, 3 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 217, 217 (2003)
(stating that the maxim ne bis in idem, or the rule against double jeopardy, "is prevalent
among the legal systems of the world").
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: "7. No
one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already
been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of
each country." United Nations Convention for the Protection of Civil and Political
Rights, art. 14, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966 (entered into force Mar. 12, 1976).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This constitutional guarantee encompasses several
protections: it bars a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal, e.g.,
Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462 (2005); Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140
(1986); it bars a second prosecution for the same offense following a conviction, e.g.,
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977)
(per curiam); it forbids multiple punishments for the same offense in successive
proceedings, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997); Missouri v. Hunter, 459
U.S. 359, 366 (1983); and in some circumstances, it prohibits a second prosecution for
the same offense following the premature termination of a trial because of the declaration of a
mistrial, e.g., United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 487 (1971) (plurality opinion); Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), or the dismissal of the charge, see United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99-100 (1978).
73. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, § 11 (h) (U.K.).
74. INDIA CONST. art. 20, § 2. See also Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 26(2), 1990
S.N.Z. No. 109 ("No one who has been finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned
for, an offence shall be tried or punished for it again."); Crimes Act 1961, § 357(1), 1961
S.N.Z. No. 43 ('The following special pleas... may be pleaded according to the provisions
hereinafter contained-that is to say, a plea of previous acquittal, a plea of previous
conviction, and a plea of pardon."); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 35(3)(m) ("Every accused
person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right-not to be tried for an offence
in respect of an act or omission for which that person has previously been either
acquitted or convicted."); ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156,
supra note 36, app. B (1999) (setting forth the law of double jeopardy in a variety of countries).
75. Maria Fletcher, Some Developments to the ne bis in idem Principle in the
European Union: Criminal Proceedings Against H0seyn Gtzutok and Klaus Brtigge, 66
MOD. L.R. 769, 770 (2003) (asserting that the ne bis in idem "rule is recognised in some
form within the domestic legal systems of all the European Economic Area Member
States"); Dietrich Oehler, Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgements: The European
System, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 607, 613 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed.
1999) (asserting that in Europe, "every state founded on constitutional principles
acknowledges the principle of ne bis in idem as a national maxim"); see generally id. at
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person should not be prosecuted more than once for the same offense.77
613-18.
76. United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1998); e.g., Bassiouni,
supra note 71, at 288.
77. Conway, supra note 71, at 217 (stating that the maxim ne bis in idem expresses
"[t]he principle that a person should not be prosecuted more than once for the same
criminal conduct"); Fletcher, supra note 75, at 770 ("The ne bis in idem rule ... states
that no-one shall be prosecuted or tried twice for the same acts and for the same criminal
behaviour."); ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 1.13 n.15
(translating ne bis in idem as: "A person may not be prosecuted twice for the same
thing."); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (8th ed. 2004) (defining non bis in
idem as "[niot twice for the same thing," and stating that the maxim usually refers "to the
law forbidding more than one trial for the same offense"). The maxim sometimes is
translated as "nobody should be punished more than once for the same offense." E.g.,
Oehler, supra note 75, at 613.
Conway explains that "[t]he phrase is derived from the Roman law maxim nemo bis
vexari pro una et eadem causa (a man shall not be twice vexed or tried for the same
cause)." Conway, supra note 71, at 217 n.1, 221; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1736 (8th ed. 2004) (translating the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem
causa as: "No one ought to be twice troubled for one and the same cause").
The precise scope of the protection afforded an individual by the rule against double
jeopardy may differ from country to country. For example, in the United States, a person
is placed in jeopardy (i.e., jeopardy "attaches") at that point in a proceeding when he is
"'put to trial before the trier of the facts,"' Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388
(1975) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)), so
that under some circumstances the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a second trial of an
individual for the same offense even if his first trial ended prematurely without a
judgment of either conviction or acquittal. E.g., Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487 (plurality opinion)
(concluding that the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial following the trial
judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial to allow several government witnesses the
opportunity to consult with attorneys about their privilege against self-incrimination);
Downum, 372 U.S. at 737-38 (holding that the double jeopardy provision prohibited
retrial following the trial judge's declaration of a mistrial, at the prosecutor's request and
over the defendant's objection, because of the absence of a key government witness); see
generally RuDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 43-73. In England, however, the protection afforded
by the autrefois rules applies only following an acquittal or a conviction. Connelly v.
DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254, 1305-06 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (Lord Morris of
Borth-y-Gest); ARCHBOLD, supra note 18, § 4-117; ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT
No. 267, supra note 18, 2.2, 2.47; WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 164. On the other
hand, a person charged with an offense in England can plead autrefois acquit or autrefois
convict based upon a former acquittal or a former conviction, as the case may be, in
another country, Treacy v. DPP, [1971] A.C. 537, 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.) (Lord Diplock) ("[T]he common law doctrine of autrefois convict and autrefois
acquit... has always applied whether the previous conviction or acquittal based on the
same facts was by an English court or by a foreign court .. "); ARCHBOLD, supra note
18, § 4-130; ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 2.6 n.9, while
in the United States, two separate sovereigns, such as two states, the federal government
and a state, or the federal government and a foreign country, can each prosecute an
individual for the same conduct. E.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 83, 87, 93 (1985)
(holding that the State of Alabama could try an individual for the capital offense of
The protection against double jeopardy has a long history.78 Both the
Old Testament and the Talmud show that ancient Jewish law recognized
the principle to some extent, 79 as did early Greek 8° and Roman law.81
Canon law also contained a prohibition against double jeopardy. The
principle apparently entered the English common law no later than the
murder during a kidnapping even though the State of Georgia had previously tried and
convicted him of murder based upon the same homicide); Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 196 (1959) (holding that an individual's trial and conviction in an Illinois state
court for conspiring to injure or destroy property of another did not bar his subsequent
prosecution by the United States for conspiring to destroy property of a telephone
company, even though both prosecutions were based upon the same conduct); Rezaq,
134 F.3d at 1127-28 (holding that an individual's prosecution and conviction in Malta
for murder, attempted murder, and hostage-taking did not bar his subsequent prosecution
by the United States for air piracy, even though both prosecutions arose from the same
incident); see generally RUDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 84-92. Although, in the United
States, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars the government from
appealing or otherwise seeking review of an acquittal when reversal of the acquittal
would require either "a second trial [or] further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the
resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged," Smalis v.
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 146 (1986) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 580 (1977)); accord Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 63-64
(1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975); United States v. Sisson,
399 U.S. 267, 289 (1970); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per
curiam); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896); see also Smith, 543 U.S. at 473
(holding that in a jury trial the judge cannot reconsider his midtrial final acquittal of the
defendant); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904) (precluding the government
from trying the defendant a second time on the merits in an appellate court), some
countries allow such an appeal. E.g., Strafproze3ordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal
Procedure] Apr. 7, 1987, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI. 11 1074, as amended, §§ 296,
333-58 (allowing an appeal on the law only); id. §§ 296, 312-332 (allowing an appeal on
both fact and law against a finding of the Amtsgericht, the court that tries less serious
crimes).
78. See generally RUDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 1-15; JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-21 (1969); GEORGE C.
THOMAS II, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 72-84 (1998); David S.
Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 196-232 (2005).
79. See Rudstein, supra note 78, at 197-98.
80. See id. at 198-99.
81. See id. at 199-200.
82. See id. at 200-02.
The canon law's prohibition emanated from an interpretation of Nahum 1:9 (King
James), a verse in the Old Testament, given in A.D. 391 by Saint Jerome. MARTIN L.
FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5, 327 (1969); HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL
CANON LAW 287 (1986); RUDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 4; SIGLER, supra note 78, at 3;
THOMAS, supra note 78, at 72; see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 n.4 (1959)
(Black, J., dissenting). That verse provides: "Affliction shall not rise up the second
time." Nahum 1:9 (King James). Saint Jerome interpreted this verse, perhaps erroneously,
see FRIEDLAND, supra, at 327 n.1; THOMAS, supra note 78, at 72; Rudstein, supra note
78, at 202, to mean "that God does not punish twice for the same act." Bartkus, 359
U.S. at 152 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting) (relying upon 25 MIGNE, PATROLOGIA LATINA
1238 (1845)). His interpretation entered church canons as early as 847, being cited that
year in the Council of Mainz and repeated in the Council of Worms in 868. Z.N. BROOKE,
THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY 205 n. 1 (1989).
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beginning of the thirteenth century,8 3 perhaps from the European Continent
through either canon law or Roman law,84 perhaps as a result of the
posthumous victory of Thomas A Becket, the Archbishop of Canterbury,
over King Henry II in the twelfth century power struggle between Henry
and the Church, 85 or perhaps "evolv[ing] from Anglo-Saxon criminal
procedure as a practical and obvious procedural assumption by the
courts., 86 Regardless of its source, by the second half of the eighteenth
century, the protection against double jeopardy, in the form of the pleas
of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, had become firmly entrenched
in the common law.87 Shortly thereafter, in 1791, a guarantee against
double jeopardy became part of the Constitutions of both the United
States 88 and France.
89
83. The first recorded mention in English law of a person raising a plea of a former
acquittal to bar his prosecution for the same offense appears to have occurred in 1201.
Plea 737 (Sumerset), in 68 PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR His JUSTICES 1198-1202, at 217
(Doris Mary Stenton ed., Quaritch 1952) (holding null Goscelin's appeal, i.e., a private
suit seeking punishment, against Adam de Rupe for killing Goscelin's brother Ailnoth,
alternatively, because "on another occasion" Ailnoth's wife brought an appeal against de
Rupe for the same killing and he "withdrew quit therein"). For a brief history of the
double jeopardy principle in English common law, see Rudstein, supra note 78, at 202-
21.
Spanish law recognized a protection against double jeopardy no later than the middle
of the thirteenth century. E.g., 5 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 1309 (Robert I. Bums ed., Samuel
Parsons Scott trans., Univ. of Pennsylvania Press 2001) ("Where a man has been acquitted, by
a valid judgment, of some offense of which he was accused, no one can afterwards
charge him with the same offense [except when he colluded in bringing the original
charge and suppressed evidence in order to obtain the acquittal]."); ALFONSO X, FUERO
REAL, lib. iv, tit. xxi, 1. 13 (Azucena Palacios Alcaine ed., PPU 1991) (1255) ("Et si
fidalgo lo fiziere a otro omne, o otro omne a fidalgo, o otros entr si que non sean fijos
dalgo non son por ent aleusos; si non si lo fizieren en tregua o en pleyto que ayan puesto
uno con otro; ca el pleyto de la amiztat antigua non fue fecho si non tan solamiente los
fijos dalgo." (translated in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 120 (1904), as: "After
a man, accused of any crime, has been acquitted by the court, no one can afterwards
accuse him of the same offense (except in certain specified cases)"; accord Lebbeus R.
Wilfley, Trial by Jury and "Double Jeopardy" in the Philippines, 13 YALE L.J. 421, 424
(1904))).
84. See Rudstein, supra note 78, at 205.
85. See id. at 205-08. The available evidence suggests that prior to Henry 11's
capitulation in 1176 the common law did not contain a protection against double
jeopardy. Id. at 209-10. Even after Henry's capitulation, it took hundreds of years for
the protection to develop into its modem form. Id. at 210-21.
86. Jill Hunter, The Development of the Rule Against Double Jeopardy, 5 J. LEGAL
HIST. 3, 4 (1984); see also Rudstein, supra note 78, at 208-09.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."). For a discussion of the protection against
double jeopardy in America before the adoption of the Fifth Amendment and the
B. Policies Underlying the Rule Barring a Retrial
Following an Acquittal9"
Barring the government 91 from prosecuting an individual a second
legislative events leading up to the ratification of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, see Rudstein, supra note 78, at 221-32.
89. 1791 CONST. tit. III, c. V, 9 ("No man acquitted by a legal jury may be
apprehended or accused again for the same act."), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS AND
OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE, 1789-1907, at 87
(Frank Maloy Anderson ed., 2d ed. 1908).
The principle continued to be recognized in the constitution of the year II1 (1795),
1795 CONST. tit. VIII, 245 ("No person acquitted by a legal jury can be re-arrested or
accused of the same offence."), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE, 1789-1907, supra, at 242, in the
code of 3 Brumaire, year IV (1796), see Wilfley, supra note 83, at 424, and in the 1808
Napoleonic Code of Criminal Instruction (code d'instruction criminalle). See id. Article
360 of the Napoleonic Code provided: "No person legally acquitted can be a second time
arrested or accused by reason of the same act." Id.
90. See generally RuDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 37-43.
91. For the sake of convenience, the Article will discuss the rule against double
jeopardy in terms of a limitation upon the government while recognizing that, at least in
England and Wales, a private individual can bring a prosecution, see Prosecution of
Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, §§ 1, 6 (establishing a prosecuting service for England and
Wales, but expressly reserving, with certain exceptions, the right of a private individual
to institute and conduct criminal proceedings); WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 5; e.g.,
Hayter v. L, (1998) 1 W.L.R. 854, 859 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.) (allowing a private prosecution
of two youths for affray and assault occasioning actual bodily harm to proceed), and that
the autrefois doctrine applies to such private prosecutions, e.g., SIR WILLIAM MACPHERSON OF
CLUNY, THE STEPHEN LAWRENCE INQUIRY 2.3 (1999) ("Three of the prime suspects [in
the unlawful killing of Stephen Lawrence] were taken to trial in 1996 in a private
prosecution [for murder] which failed because of the absence of any firm and sustainable
evidence. The trial resulted in the acquittal of all three accused. They can never be tried
again in any circumstances in the present state of the law." (emphasis omitted)); id.
43.47 ("The result of the unsuccessful [private] prosecution was that the three men who
were acquitted can never be tried again .... ); see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at
*335 (stating that "an acquittal on appeal [a form of private prosecution] is a good bar to
an indictment on the same offence... [a]nd so also was an acquittal on an indictment a
good bar to an appeal, by the common law"). Such prosecutions are relatively rare,
however. In the United States, private prosecutions are permissible in some states but
only for minor offenses. E.g., State v. Martineau, 808 A.2d 51, 53-54 (N.H. 2002)
(concluding that private prosecutions are permissible only for offenses not punishable by
imprisonment); In re Grand Jury Appearance Request by Loigman, 870 A.2d 249, 253 n.
I (N.J. 2005) (noting that private prosecutions are permissible in municipal court, but
also stating that they are not favored); Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866,
871-72 (R.I. 2001) (holding that private prosecutions are permissible in misdemeanor
cases). Although the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 451 (1989), method of analysis disavowed by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93
(1997), stated that "[t]he protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by
litigation between private parties," it did so immediately following the statement that
"nothing in [its] opinion precludes a private party from filing a civil suit seeking
damages for conduct that previously was the subject of criminal prosecution and
punishment." (emphasis added). The Court thereby indicated that its statement that the
double jeopardy provision does not apply in "litigation between private parties" was
limited to civil actions for damages, as opposed to criminal prosecutions brought by a
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time for the same offense following his trial and acquittal92 serves a
number of related and often overlapping interests, both of the individual
and of society as a whole.9 3 First, it "preserve[s] the fmality of judgments. 94
private individual. Id. Certainly, that is the correct result. For, as one court stated, "the
complainant in a private ... prosecution stands in a qualitatively different relationship to
the defendant than in a civil action." Cronan, 774 A.2d at 866 n.1 (in amending the
caption of the case to reflect "the criminal nature of [the] case"). More importantly,
though, because the defendant in a private prosecution faces "the risk that is traditionally
associated with a criminal prosecution," Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975), he
must be deemed to be placed in jeopardy for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause
once he is 'put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a
judge,"' Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975) (quoting United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
92. In the United States, a trial judge's ostensible "acquittal" of an individual does
not necessarily constitute an acquittal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment because what constitutes an acquittal is not controlled by the form of
the trial judge's action. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977); see also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978) ("[Tlhe trial judge's
characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the action."
(quoting Jorn, 400 U.S. at 478 n.7 (plurality opinion))). "Rather, a defendant is
acquitted [by a trial judge] only when 'the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually
represents a resolution [in the defendant's favor], correct or not, of some or all of the
factual elements of the offense charged."' Id. at 97 (quoting Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. at 571) (alteration in original).
93. As indicated by the title of this subsection, the Author is limiting the
discussion in the text to those policies relating to the prohibition against trying an
individual following his previous acquittal for the same offense. The rule against double
jeopardy, of course, also prohibits retrial following a conviction, see supra text
accompanying notes 62-65, 67, and supra note 72, and as noted previously, in the United
States, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in some circumstances prohibits a new
trial following the premature termination of an individual's initial trial. See supra note
72. Some of the same policies underlying the prohibition of a new trial for the same
offense following an acquittal also apply in those contexts. In addition, prohibiting a
new trial following a conviction for the same offense recognizes the injustice inherent in
punishing an individual twice for the same offense, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 154
(Black, J., dissenting); see also Halper, 490 U.S. at 440; Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. at 569 n.6; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 728-29 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting);
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947) (plurality opinion); Ex
parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1874), and prevents the government from
attempting to secure a greater penalty in a retrial than that originally imposed. See
Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10; see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
Moreover, prohibiting a new trial following the premature termination of a trial, helps to
protect "a defendant's 'valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal,"'
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1978) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689
(1949)), that is, his interest in "being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation
with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed
to his fate." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514 (1978) (quoting Jorn, 400 U.S.
at 486 (plurality opinion)).
94. Crist, 437 U.S. at 33. See infra text accompanying notes 103-20.
Second, it minimizes the "distress and trauma of the trial process.
95
Third, it reduces the risk of erroneously convicting an innocent person.
Fourth, it protects the power, or perhaps the right, of the jury, acting as
representatives of the community, to acquit an individual against the
evidence, that is, even though sufficient evidence of his guilt exists. 97
Fifth, it "encourage[s] efficient investigation"98 of crimes by the police and
efficient prosecution of individuals charged with crimes.99 Sixth, it helps to
conserve scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources.'00 Seventh, it helps
to prevent police and prosecutors from using the criminal process to
harass an individual who has been tried and acquitted.'0 l Finally, it helps to
maintain the public's respect for, and confidence in, the legal system.
10 2
1. Preserving the Finality of Judgments
"[T]he public interest requires finality in litigation, including criminal
litigation,.... so that life can move on." '" °3 This statement by the English
Law Commission'0 4 articulates what the Supreme Court of the United
States has called "the primary purpose"' 1 5 served by the rule against
double jeopardy. 0 6 By precluding the government from re-prosecuting
95. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36, 4.7.
See infra text accompanying notes 121-33.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 134-51.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 152-61.
98. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 18, 4.3.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 162-67.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 170-72.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 173-79.
103. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36,
4.8 (footnote omitted) (also stating that "there is virtue in putting a line under emotive
and contentious events").
104. The Law Commission is a body of five Commissioners appointed by the Lord
Chancellor. Law Commissions Act, 1965, c. 22, § 1(1) (Eng.). Parliament established
the Law Commission in 1965 "[flor the purpose of promoting the reform of the law [of
England and Wales]." Id. The Law Commission is charged with
tak[ing] and keep[ing] under review all the law... with a view to its systematic
development and reform, including in particular the codification of such law,
the elimination of anomalies, the repeal of obsolete and unnecessary enactments,
the reduction of the number of separate enactments and generally the
simplification and modernisation of the law ....
Id. § 3(l).
105. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978); see also United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) ("It has been said that... 'the' 'primary purpose' of
the [Double Jeopardy] Clause was 'to preserve the finality of judgments[]'...."
(quoting Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978))).
106. See also AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note
39, at 2-4 (discussing "the various interests in securing finality of decisions"); NEW
ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 14 ("The need to secure a
conclusion of disputes concerning status has long been recognised. The status conferred
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an acquitted individual for the same offense, the rule maintains the
finality of judgments10 7 and protects the "integrity" of those judgments. 10 8
Once a person has been acquitted of a particular offense, the government
must respect that judgment. Even if it disagrees with the result, it cannot
bring a second prosecution against the same person for the same offense.' 0 9
by acquittal is one of particular importance.").
The doctrine of res judicata serves this purpose in civil cases. That doctrine provides
that a final judgment based upon the merits of a claim precludes the plaintiff from
instituting a second action against the same defendant for the same claim and, conversely,
bars the defendant from subsequently raising a new defense to seek to defeat the
enforcement of a judgment rendered against him in the action. See generally JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 14.1-14.8,
14.13 (4th ed. 2005).
107. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128; Crist, 437 U.S. at 33; Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion); see also Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S.
147, 156 (1986) (discussing the importance of finality in sentencing decisions); United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) (examining finality concerns raised by
additional punishment arising from a second trial); ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION,
CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36, J 4.8-4.10 (explaining the relationship
between finality and a defendant's distress); NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT
70, supra note 40, 14 (repeating the connection between finality and a defendant's
distress).
108. Scott, 437 U.S. at 92.
109. In the United States, the Double Jeopardy Clause also bars the government
from appealing or otherwise seeking review of an acquittal when reversal of the acquittal
would require either "a second trial [or] further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the
resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged." Smalis v.
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 146 (1986) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 580 (1977)); see also supra note 77.
In England, the government can appeal an acquittal rendered in a magistrate's court by
way of case stated. Such an appeal, however, is limited to a claim that the verdict was
either "wrong in law" or "in excess of jurisdiction." Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980, c. 43,
§ 111(1) (Eng.); e.g., DPP v. Milton, [2006] EWHC (Admin) 242, 2006 R.T.R. 21 (Q.B.)
(Eng.) (allowing the government's appeal of a police officer's acquittal for driving
dangerously, and remitting the case to the Magistrate's Court for a rehearing by a
differently constituted tribunal). Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, in a trial on an
indictment, the government can appeal to the Court of Appeal a trial court's ruling,
entered at the end of the prosecution's case, that "there is no case to answer," i.e., a
directed verdict of acquittal, see SPRACK, supra note 38, § 20.48, and if the Court of
Appeal reverses the ruling, it can order the proceedings for the offense to be resumed or
that a new trial take place. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 57-61, 67-74 (Eng.). In
addition, in a case in which an individual was tried on an indictment and acquitted, the
Attorney General can appeal by referring a point of law to the Court of Appeal, Criminal
Justice Act, 1972, c. 71, § 36(1) (Eng.), but such a reference does "not affect the trial in
relation to which the reference is made or any acquittal in that trial." Id. § 36(7); see
generally ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 18,
2.2, 2.13, 2.14 (2000).
A person acquitted of a crime, along with his family and dependents,1 10
need not "live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity," I fearful
that, despite the acquittal, the government will subsequently haul the
accused into court a second time and compel him to defend against the
same charge. 1 2 Without such a limitation, a person found not guilty of a
crime could never be sure that he was effectively acquitted, no matter
how many times a trier of fact found him not guilty, for the government
could repeatedly try him until it attained a conviction.
In addition to serving as an "antidote to distress and anxiety,"" 3 according
absolute finality to a judgment of acquittal allows the defendant to
consider the matter closed and to plan his future accordingly. The
English Law Commission recently recognized that in this "important
sense[,] . . . finality as a value ... impact[s] ... individual liberty or
autonomy. "4 The Law Commission explained:
In a liberal democracy, it is a fundamental political and social objective to
allow individuals as much personal autonomy as possible, to allow people the
space to live their own lives and pursue their own visions of the good life. Lack
of finality in criminal proceedings impinges on this to a significant degree, in
that the individual, though acquitted of a crime, is not free thereafter to plan his
or her life, enter into engagements with others and so on, if required constantly
to have in mind the danger of being once more subject to a criminal prosecution
for the same alleged crime. 115
110. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 4.16 ("[T]here
is some value in protecting certain third party interests by finality of criminal
proceedings.... [such as] the emotional and financial interests of an acquitted person's
family and dependants."); AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DIScUSSIoN PAPER, supra
note 39, at 3 (paraphrasing the English Law Commission and stating that "the interests of
finality also affect friends, family and others dealing with the person concerned," and that
"[s]ome weight must be given to the emotional and financial interests of these people").
111. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
112. Id.; ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 18, 4.11 (quoting a
"very senior judge" as stating that it is "'important to preserve the principle that a defendant
acquitted by a jury need not worry that he may have to undergo the trial process all over
again'); ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36,
4.9 ("In a serious case the prospect of going through the trial process at some future date
is likely to cause great anxiety .... At least some acquitted defendants will be prey to a constant
and persisting sense of doubt."); AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION
PAPER, supra note 39, at 3 ("[Tlhose subject, or potentially subject, to any double
jeopardy should not be subjected to the anxiety and distress occasioned by the fear that
he or she may have to undergo the admittedly stressful trial process all over again.").
113. AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 39, at 3;
accord ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 4.12.
114. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 4.12; accord
AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 39, at 3.
115. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 4.12; accord
AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 39, at 3.
Professor Ian Dennis put it this way:
Fairness to the defendant-again an aspect of the state's concern to treat all
citizens with respect for their liberty and autonomy-results in a claim that
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The Law Commission acknowledged that "[r]educing the personal
autonomy of the individual may, of course, occasion distress and
anxiety,"' 16 but it concluded that "that is not the only reason for valuing
it"1 17-"autonomy or liberty in this sense is to be valued for its own
sake.""'18
The finality of a judgment of acquittal also serves an additional purpose.
As expressed by the English Law Commission,
The finality involved in the rule against double jeopardy... represents an
enduring and resounding acknowledgement by the state that it respects the
principle of limited government and the liberty of the subject. The rule against
double jeopardy is, on this view, a symbol of the rule of law and can have a
pervasive educative effect. The rule serves to emphasise commitment to democratic
values. 119
Quoting Professor Paul Roberts, the Law Commission went on to
explain:
Double jeopardy protection is very imperfectly expressed in terms of fairness to
the accused... It is more illuminating to think of double jeopardy as forming
one, significant strand of the limits on a state's moral authority to censure and
punish through criminal law. A defendant is not pleading unfair treatment qua
criminal accused when invoking the pleas in bar [autrefois acquit (a former
acquittal) and autrefois convict (a former conviction)], but rather reminding the
state-as the community's representative, the community in whose name the
business of criminal justice is done--of the limits of its power .... Defendants
asserting double jeopardy protection act almost as private attorneys general,
policing the boundaries of legitimacy in criminal law enforcement, keeping state
power in check for the benefit of all who value democracy and personal
freedom. This is the special value of finality in criminal proceedings, and the
principal rationale underpinning double jeopardy protection. The fundamental
nature of the values at stake explains why English law's pleas in bar operate as
final judgment of acquittal should represent a line drawn under the past. The
defendant should be able to get on with the rest of his life in a state of security
from further prosecution. We might say that an acquitted person deserves
a fresh start: that it would be unfair to deprive him of the right of self-
determination free of the restraints imposed by knowledge of the possibility of
further interference in his life through reopening of the acquittal.
Ian Dennis, Rethinking Double Jeopardy: Justice and Finality in Criminal Process,
[2000] CRIM. L.R. 933, 941 (Eng.). See also Paul Roberts, Double Jeopardy Law Reform: A
Criminal Justice Commentary, 65 MOD. L. REv. 393, 407 (2002) ("I surely have a keen[]
interest.., in knowing whether my autonomy is vulnerable to the potentially swingeing
restrictions of criminal sanctions.").
116. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 4.12.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. 4.17; accord AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER,
supra note 39, at 3.
near-absolute barriers to re-prosecution whenever their conditions precedent are
satisfied.1
20
2. Minimizing the Distress and Trauma of the Trial Process
In an oft-quoted statement, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Green v. United States12 1 explained that one of the underlying concerns
of the rule against double jeopardy "is that the state with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal."'' 22 Noted English scholar Glanville Williams made
the same point when he stated that it would be "hard on the defendant if,
after he has at great cost in money and anxiety secured a favorable verdict
from a jury on a particular issue, he must fight the battle over again."'' 23
As these statements indicate, defending against a criminal charge can
be a "grueling"'124 process for a person. In the absence of legal aid, it can place
a heavy financial burden on an individual. 125 Those who can afford it
120. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 4.17 (quoting
Paul Roberts, Acquitted Misconduct Evidence and Double Jeopardy Principles, from
Sambasivam to Z, [2000] CRiM. L.R. 952, 954 (Eng.) (omissions in original)); accord
AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 39, at 3-4.
121. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
122. Id. at 187; accord Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352 (2006); Monge v.
California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998); Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S.
294, 307 (1984); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981); United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1980); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87
(1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,
504 n.13 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977); United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975);
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,
479 (1971) (plurality opinion); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969); Pearce v.
The Queen (1998) 194 C.L.R. 610, 614 (Austl.) (McHugh, Hayne & Callinan, JJ.); id. at
636 (Kirby, J.); see also ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156,
supra note 36, 7 4.6, 4.7 (noting the effects also extend to the individual's family, the
witness, and the victim); ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 4.3;
NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 12-13.
123. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 164. Williams was writing about a subsequent
prosecution for a different offense, but one arising out of the same facts as the first. As
the English Law Commission pointed out, though, "clearly the principle also applies to
true autrefois cases." ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra
note 36, 4.6 n. 14.
124. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 7 13.
125. See Susan Chandler, Free Ryan Defense Could Get Expensive If Mistrial
Declared, Rerun Would Be Costly, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 30, 2006, at Business 1 (stating that
the defense costs in the fraud trial of former Illinois Governor George H. Ryan stood at
$10 million as of November of 2005 and noting that the defendant's lead lawyer bills at
the rate of $750 per hour), available at 2006 WLNR 7238109; Junior Gotti: They're
Breaking Me, CNN., Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/03/14/goti.retrial.ap/
index.html (after a second jury deadlocked on charges alleging that John "Junior" Gotti,
the son of a late mob boss, arranged a brutal beating of an individual, and after the trial
judge set the date for a third trial, Gotti's lawyer said Gotti is struggling financially to
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nearly always retain an attorney. 126 In addition, they frequently hire an
investigator to help locate witnesses and find evidence favorable to their
defense, and they may employ experts and other specialists to assist in
the preparation of their case and perhaps to testify in their behalf at the
trial. 1
27
fight the charges and told the judge that Gotti needed time to borrow money to pay his
attorneys).
126. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[T]here are few
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get
to prepare and present their defenses."). In the United States, an indigent charged with a
felony is constitutionally entitled to have counsel appointed to represent him at the
government's expense, id. at 343-45, an indigent charged with a misdemeanor or other
lesser offense cannot be imprisoned unless counsel is appointed to represent him.
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74
(1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
In England, legal aid is available to those criminal defendants who cannot afford
counsel. Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, §§ 12-15, 17 (Eng.). Accordingly, as the
English Law Commission recently stated in its discussion of English double jeopardy
law, "[t]he cost [to a criminal defendant] in money may not be of great significance in
this country because of the availability of legal aid." ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION,
CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36, 4.6. For a brief description of the
English system for providing legal aid to those accused of crime, see Norman Lefstein,
In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal Help,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 861-904 (2004).
127. In the United States, due process of law may constitutionally entitle an
indigent defendant to certain assistance, in addition to counsel, at the government's
expense. E.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that "when [an
accused] demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense [will] be
a significant factor at trial, the [government] must, at a minimum, assure [him] access to
a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense"). Statutes, rules of court, or
administrative orders frequently provide for such assistance at the government's
expense. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (2000) (providing for "investigative, expert, and
other services ... necessary for adequate representation"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-
212(a)(l)-(2), (b)(1) (Supp. 2007) (authorizing the Arkansas Public Defender Commission
"to pay for certain expenses regarding the defense of indigents," including "expert
witnesses, temporary investigators, testing, and travel," and authorizing trial public
defenders and appointed private attorneys to utilize the services of the state crime lab);
S.F. SUPER. CT. UNw. Loc. R. 16.18(D) (providing for reimbursement of private appointed
counsel for "[e]xpenses such as expert witness or investigator costs, reasonably necessary
for private counsel"), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/courts/local-rule
16 8-2007.pdf; FLA. 9TH JUD. CIR. ADMIN. ORDER No. 2000-16(11)(A)(1) (2000)
(providing for the appointment of an attorney in lieu of the public defender and for
appointment of necessary "experts, investigators, and other specialists"); IND. CODE §
33-40-7-9(3) (2004) (providing that appointed counsel "may request authorization from
the judge hearing the case for expenditures for investigative services, expert witnesses,
or other services necessary to provide adequate legal representation"). See generally 3
DAVID S. RUDSTEIN, C. PETER ERLINDER & DAVID C. THOMAS, CRIMINAL CONSTITrTIONAL
LAW 13.07 (1990-2007) [hereinafter RUDSTEIN ET AL.].
The stress of defending oneself in a criminal prosecution can also
affect an individual both emotionally and physically. A criminal charge
generally causes embarrassment to the accused and may cause friends,
neighbors, colleagues, and even relatives to disapprove of and become
suspicious and distrustful of him. Additionally, an accused who has a
family or a job will likely fear the effect the pending charge and possible
conviction will have on his family life or employment or both. Perhaps
even more importantly, the individual will worry about his impending
trial and the possibility that he will be convicted and punished, sentenced
perhaps to a lengthy term of incarceration. 128 These concerns may exact
not only a psychological toll on the accused, but a physical one as
well. 129
This "heavy personal strain' 130 inevitably accompanies any criminal
charge, as does the expense that must be borne by one who is not
indigent or otherwise entitled to legal aid. The rule against double jeopardy,
however, is intended, in part, to minimize the expense, distress, and
trauma to an individual accused of a crime by confining it, in most
cases,13 1 to a single trial. 132 Once an individual is acquitted, he need
128. In the United States, a defendant convicted of certain offenses may, depending
on the jurisdiction, even be sentenced to death. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2000) (providing
for the death penalty for murder in the first degree); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(c)(l)(A) (2000)
(providing for the death penalty for certain acts of terrorism resulting in death); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 37(a) (West 1999) (providing for the death penalty for treason against the
state); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West Supp. 2007) (providing for the death penalty for
murder in the first degree); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/9-1(b) (2006) (providing for the
death penalty in certain cases of first degree murder); 720 ILL. COM. STAT. § 5/30-1(c)
(2006) (providing for the death penalty for treason against the state).
129. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975).
Moreover, as the English Law Commission recognized, "[t]his distress is not confined
to the defendant. His or her family also suffers, as do witnesses on both sides, including
the alleged victim." ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra
note 36, 4.7; see also NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 13
("[T]he process of a criminal trial is... a process which may have been grueling for all
involved and even hideous ... for the victim, the accused, witnesses and their families.").
130. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (quoting
United States v. Jon, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
131. In the United States, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not absolutely bar the
government from trying an individual a second time for the same offense. For example,
it can retry a defendant following a mistrial declared either at the defendant's request or
with his consent, United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-09 (1976), or when,
regardless of the defendant's consent, either a "manifest necessity" existed for the
declaration of the mistrial or the "ends of public justice" would otherwise have been
defeated. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); accord Dinitz, 424
U.S. at 606-07. In addition, the government generally can retry a convicted defendant
whose conviction is overturned on appeal because of trial error, e.g., Lockhart v. Nelson,
488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988); Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 402-04 (1987), or an acquitted
defendant whose acquittal was obtained in a court lacking jurisdiction over either the
accused or the offense. E.g., United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). In England, the
autrefois rules apply only when a defendant's first trial ended in either a conviction or an
248
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never again have to undergo the "distress and trauma of the trial process"' 33
for the same offense.
3. Reducing the Risk of an Erroneous Conviction
Prohibiting a new trial of an individual following his acquittal for the
same offense prevents the government from attempting to persuade a
second fact finder of the individual's guilt "after having failed with the
first." 134 In doing so, it reduces the risk of an erroneous conviction.
Indeed, Professor Martin L. Friedland asserts that the increased chances
of convicting an innocent person at a second trial for the same offense
"is at the core of the problem."' 135 As the United States Supreme Court
recognized in Green v. United States, 3 6 if the government were allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an offense, it
would "enhanc[e] the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty."'1 37 The risk of erroneously convicting an innocent person
acquittal. Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254, 1305-06 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.) (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest); ARCHBOLD, supra note 18, § 4-117; ENGLISH LAW
COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 2.2, 2.47; WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at
164. Consequently, those rules do not bar a retrial following a mistrial. ARCHBOLD,
supra note 18, §§ 4-262, 4-440. Even when a trial ends in a conviction or acquittal, the
government may sometimes try the accused a second time for the same offense. For
example, a defendant who successfully appeals his conviction can be retried, Criminal
Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 7 (Eng.), as can one who was acquitted in a court lacking
jurisdiction to try the offense with which he was charged. See ARCHBOLD, supra note
18, § 4-118; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *335. See generally RUDSTEIN, supra note
18, at 92-155.
132. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977); accord Smalis v.
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 143 n.4 (1986); Breed, 421 U.S. at 529-30. Professor
Dennis states that this purpose of the rule against double jeopardy is based upon "the
state's duty of humanity to its citizens, which is an aspect of the liberal imperative to
treat all citizens with dignity and respect." Dennis, supra note 115, at 940.
133. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 36, 4.7.
134. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
135. FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 4.
136. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
137. Id. at 188; accord Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 307
(1984); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1980); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87, 91 (1978); Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 n.13 (1978);
Abney, 431 U.S. at 661-62; United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976); Serfass v.
United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975); Wilson, 420 U.S. at 343; United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96
(1969); Pearce v. The Queen (1998) 194 C.L.R. 610, 614 (Austl.) (McHugh, Hayne &
Callinan, JJ.); id. at 636 (Kirby, J.); AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION
PAPER, supra note 39, at 2; ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156,
would increase for several reasons. First, the fact that an individual
accused of a particular offense could face additional trials for the same
offense, even after being acquitted, might induce an innocent person to forgo
a trial entirely and plead guilty before his first trial, thereby eliminating
the possibility of multiple trials for the same offense. 138 Second, multiple
prosecutions would permit the government to use the first trial as a "dry
run"'139 or "dress rehearsal,"'140 allowing it the opportunity to "hon[e] its
trial strategies and perfect[] its evidence"'14 1 in light of what it learned at
the first trial about the weaknesses of its case 142 and the strengths 143 and
weaknesses 144 of the defendant's case. 145 For instance, the government
supra note 36, 1.3; see also NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note
40, 15 (quoting ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note
36).
138. FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 4.
139. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970).
140. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 749 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518
(1990) ("Multiple prosecutions.., give the State an opportunity to rehearse its
presentation of proof."), overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
141. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41(1982).
142. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128; Scott, 437 U.S. at 105 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352.
143. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128.
144. For example, Professor Martin L. Friedland writes that at a second trial the
defendant
may be at a greater disadvantage than he was at the first trial because he will
normally have disclosed his complete defence at the former trial. Moreover,
he may have entered the witness-box himself. The prosecutor can study the
transcript and may thereby find apparent defects and inconsistencies in the
defence evidence to use at the second trial.
FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 4.
145. See also ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra
note 36, 4.5 ("[B]ecause there has already been one trial at which the defence has
shown its hand, the prosecution may enjoy a tactical advantage at a second trial; and this
will increase the likelihood of a conviction, whether the defendant is guilty or
innocent."); NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 15 (quoting
ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36, 4.5); cf
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 n.14 (1978) (quoting Judge Leventhal's
description in Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(Leventhal, J., concurring), of how some of the government's witnesses subtly changed
their testimony over the course of four trials so that it became more favorable to the
government); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (in a prosecution for robbing a
participant in a poker game, following the defendant's acquittal of robbing another
participant, the government conceded that when the prosecutor lost the first trial, "'he
did what every good attorney would do-he refined his presentation in light of the turn
of events at. the first trial"'); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1958) (in a
prosecution for robbing a person at a tavern, following the defendant's acquittal of
robbing three other individuals at the tavern, the government altered its presentation of
proof by calling only the witness who had testified most favorably to it in the first trial).
It is true that in a second trial for the same offense "the defence may equally be in a
position to adapt their case to the prosecution strategy appropriately." Dennis, supra
note 115, at 939. As discussed in the text, however, the defendant's resources pale in
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could "'supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.'
146
Third, if multiple prosecutions were permitted, the government, with its
vastly superior resources, could wear down the defendant-financially,
147
emotionally, and physically, 148 and obtain a conviction "through sheer
governmental perseverance."' 149 Finally, "[i]f it is accepted that juries
do on occasion return perverse verdicts of guilty, the chance that a
particular defendant will be erversely convicted must increase if he or
she is tried more than once."' I5  In sum, as Professor Akhil Reed Amar
and Jonathan L. Marcus so eloquently put it, "[i]f you play with something
long enough, you are likely to break it; and if the government is allowed
to prosecute an innocent defendant enough times and disregard all
acquittals, eventually it is likely to convict an innocent (by hypothesis)
person.
1 51
comparison to those of the government, and he might be financially, emotionally, and
physically worn out after the first trial. See infra text accompanying notes 147-49. He
might therefore decide to plead guilty before the retrial because of his inability to
undergo the burden of a second trial. Even if he opts to go to trial a second time, any
knowledge of the government's evidence and its strategy he may have gained at the first
trial is likely to be of less value to him than the information gained by the government at
the first trial. For example, if the government discovered a particular weakness in its
own case, it is likely that it could do much more to eliminate that weakness (e.g., locate
and interview witnesses or conduct forensic tests) than the defendant could do if he
identified a particular weakness in his own case. Moreover, the fact that the defendant
gained information about the government's evidence or strategy does nothing to prevent
a perverse verdict of guilty in his second trial. See infra text accompanying note 150.
146. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978));
accord Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 473 n.7 (2005); DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128.
147. See supra note 125 and text accompanying notes 125-27; but see ENGLISH LAW
COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36, 4.5 (asserting that "[i]n
England and Wales, lack of financial resources is not usually a serious problem for
defendants in criminal cases because of the availability of legal aid"); see also supra
notes 126-27.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
149. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 4 (stating that
"[i]n many cases an innocent person will not have the stamina or resources effectively to
fight a second charge").
150. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36, 4.5
& n.1 1 (defining a "perverse verdict of guilty" as "a guilty verdict where there was
nothing in the trial process, save the result, that could raise a ground of appeal").
151. Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy After Rodney King,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 31 n.158 (1995). See also Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE
L.J. 262, 278 n.74 (1965) (attempting to illustrate the point through a mathematical
equation); but see Roberts, supra note 115, at 398 ("[A]n argument about the risk of
wrongful conviction appears to rest on empirical propositions.- But it does not. The
empirical foundations of the argument are unknown, and probably unknowable.").
4. Protecting the Power of the Jury to Acquit Against the Evidence
Prohibiting a second trial for the same offense following an acquittal
by a jury also protects the "'jury's prerogative to acquit against the
evidence,"'''l. that is, the jury's "legitimate authority," '  or perhaps its
right, 154 to acquit an individual "even when its findings as to the facts, if
Professor Roberts asserts that "in our current state of ignorance about the factors
predicting wrongful conviction, we have no reason to be confident that successive
retrials would materially increase the global risk of convicting the innocent ," and he
argues that "[i]f the jury at the first trial correctly acquitted an innocent defendant on the
evidence, could a second (or third...) jury, as presumptively rational fact-finders, not be
counted on to acquit again (and again)?" Id. at 399-400. The Author respectfully disagrees.
Professor Roberts would be correct if the government in the second trial presented
precisely the same evidence, in virtually the same manner, as it did in the first trial. But
that is unlikely to happen. For, after losing the first case, the prosecutor most likely
would do "'what every good attorney would do ... refine[] his presentation in light of
the turn of events at the first trial."' Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970). Ashe
provides an excellent example of why the government has an increased chance of
conviction in a second trial. There, the government prosecuted an individual for robbing
a participant in a poker game. The government's identification testimony at trial was
weak-only one of its four witnesses identified the accused in court as one of the
robbers-and the jury acquitted the accused. After the acquittal, the government tried
the individual for the robbery of one of the other participants in the poker game. At the
second trial, it elicited stronger identification testimony from three of the witnesses who
had testified at the first trial and further refined its case by declining to call the robbery
victim whose identification testimony at the first trial had been negative. Id. at 439-40.
See also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 n.14 (1978) (quoting Judge
Leventhal's description in Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810, 813-14 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (Leventhal, J., concurring)), of how some of the government's witnesses subtly
changed their testimony over the course of four trials so that it became more favorable to
the government); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1958) (in a prosecution for
robbing a person at a tavern, following the defendant's acquittal of robbing three other
individuals at the tavern, the government altered its presentation of proof by calling only
the witness who had testified most favorably to it in the first trial). Professor Roberts
also does not sufficiently take into account the effect multiple trials can have on the
defendant-financially, emotionally, and physically-and the realistic possibility that the
government will obtain a conviction "through sheer.. . perseverance." Tibbs, 457 U.S.
at 41.
152. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 n.l 1 (1980) (quoting Peter
Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of
Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1063 (1980)); see also Vikramaditya S.
Khanna, Double Jeopardy's Asymmetric Appeal Rights: What Purpose Do They Serve?,
82 B.U. L. REv. 341, 358 (2002); Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General
Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SuP. CT. REv. 81, 129-30.
153. Westen & Drubel, supra note 152, at 129.
154. In the United States, this "right" may arise from the Sixth Amendment right to
a trial by jury. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE SERIES § 24.10(a), at 612 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter
LAFAVE ET AL.] ("The sixth amendment right to jury trial includes the right to a jury
decision independent of the judge, and may protect the power of the jury to disregard the
law and acquit .... ); Westen & Drubel, supra note 152, at 133 (asserting that the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial is the source of the jury's authority to acquit against the
evidence); see also 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra, § 22.1(g), at 257-58; AUSTRALIAN MODEL
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literally applied to the law as stated by the judge, would have resulted in
a conviction."'' 55 In such situations the jury, acting "as the conscience of
the community in applying the law,"' 56 exercises its power to "nullify" the
law in the particular case,' 57 or to engage in what is called "jury equity" in
England. 158 It may do so for a variety of reasons, perhaps because it
thinks that the defendant's conduct should not be a crime, 59 or perhaps
because it believes that the punishment for the offense in question is too
severe. 16  Some scholars assert that protecting the jury's power to
nullify the law is the primary purpose served by the rule against double
jeopardy.161
5. Encouraging Efficient Investigation and Prosecution
Allowing the government to retry an acquitted defendant for the same
offense would give rise to the danger that the police would not initially
investigate the matter, 62 and prosecutors would not initially prosecute
CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 39, at 4 ("[J]uries... are entitled to
be... capricious within limits." (emphasis added)).
155. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 154, § 22.1(g), at 256; see also AUSTRALIAN
MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 39, at 4 ("[A] significant component
of the operation of the double jeopardy principle in practice must be the inscrutability of
the jury verdict.").
156. Westen & Drubel, supra note 152, at 130.
157. See generally CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A
DOCTRINE (1998); 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 154, § 22.1(g) (2d ed. 1999 & Supp.
2007).
158. Roberts, supra note 115, at 422 & n.118.
159. For example, a jury might be unwilling to convict a defendant of murder when,
out of love, he acceded to the request of his terminally-ill wife of fifty years and
intentionally killed her. Or, it might acquit a battered wife charged with murder for
intentionally killing her abusive husband, even though several days had intervened since
he last beat her and she therefore did not have a valid claim of self-defense.
160. For example, a jury might believe that possession of a small amount of
marijuana should be a criminal offense, but that the statutory minimum sentence for that
offense in the particular jurisdiction is too severe.
The judge in a bench trial also can acquit against the evidence. One would think that a
judge would be more likely than a jury to follow the law and that therefore judicial
acquittals against the evidence would occur much less frequently than jury acquittals
against the evidence. Professors Westen and Drubel, however, state that "judicial acquittals
against the evidence are apparently a common ... phenomenon." Westen & Drubel,
supra note 152, at 134 n.250 (citing DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 149 (1966)).
161. Id. at 84.
162. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36, 4.11;
AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 39, at 2; NEW
ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 16; Dennis, supra note 115, at
253
the case, 163 as diligently as they otherwise might. They would know that
should the first prosecution prove unsuccessful, they would get a "second
bite at the cherry"'164 and could carry out a more thorough investigation
before, and conduct a more vigorous prosecution at, the defendant's second
trial. 165  The fact that the rule against double jeopardy provides the
government with "but one chance to convict a defendant [therefore] operates
as a powerful incentive to efficient and exhaustive investigation"'166 and
prosecution from the outset. 1
67
6. Conserving Scarce Prosecutorial and Judicial Resources
Barring retrial for the same offense following an acquittal also conserves
limited prosecutorial and judicial resources. It prevents a prosecutor
from expending additional time, money, and effort investigating and
prosecuting a person for the same offense again and again until he achieves
941; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 4 ("It is to the first trial... that [the] efforts
[of the police] should be directed."); SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THIRD
REPORT, supra note 67, 19 (noting that one of the arguments against creating exceptions to
the traditional rule barring a retrial following an acquittal is that "a second opportunity to
prosecute would encourage the police to be less thorough in their initial investigation").
163. Dennis, supra note 115, at 941; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 4 ("It is
to the first trial ... that [the] efforts [of the prosecutor] should be directed.").
164. Ian Dennis, Double Jeopardy: A Second Bite at the Cherry, 1999 CRIM. L.R.
927, 927 (Eng.); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) ("'second bite at
the apple').
165. Initially, the Author was somewhat skeptical of the argument that police officers
would conduct a less diligent investigation of a case if they knew that the government
would be able to try an individual a second time following an unsuccessful prosecution.
A number of veteran police officers, from both urban and suburban police departments
in the United States, assured the Author that the skepticism was unwarranted. They
told the Author that given the heavy case loads of their police departments, they, and
their fellow officers, would be much more willing to "wrap up" an investigation and "move
on to the next case" at an earlier point under a regime that allowed the government to
retry an individual should he or she be acquitted at trial than under the current regime
that bars a subsequent prosecution following an acquittal. Given the heavy case loads
facing prosecutors in urban areas in the United States, it would not be surprising to find
that they possessed the same mind-set. With respect to England, the Author is willing to
defer to the conclusions of the Law Commission. See ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION,
CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36, 4.11.
166. Id.; see also NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 16
(stating that the argument that the rule against double jeopardy "promot[es] . .. efficient
investigation preceding prosecution of the original trial... has obvious force"); but see
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THIRD REPORT, supra note 67, 46-48
(reporting that neither the Director of Public Prosecutions, nor the Chief Constable of
Kent, agreed that an exception to the traditional rule against double jeopardy allowing a
second trial when new evidence of an acquitted defendant's guilt is discovered "would
allow the police to proceed without due diligence" in their initial investigation, and
concluding that "[w]e do not expect that the proposed relaxation of the double jeopardy
rule would have an adverse impact on the quality of future police investigations"
(emphasis omitted)).
167. Dennis, supra note 115, at 941.
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the desired result, a conviction. 168 Similarly, it keeps prosecutors from
tying up courtrooms, judges, and court personnel in successive attempts
to convict an individual for the same offense.1
69
7. Preventing Harassment
If the government could retry an individual for the same offense
following his acquittal, that power "could be used illegitimately by ill-
intentioned state servants."' 7 ° Absent the rule against double jeopardy, it
is possible that "the police, unhappy at [an individual's] being found not
guilty, would unfairly pursue the person in order to try to bring about a
second trial."' 17 1 Similarly, a prosecutor who believed that a fact finder
erroneously acquitted a guilty individual could harass that individual by
continuing to investigate him for the same offense in the hope of finding
new evidence implicating him in the crime.' 72 Even if the police or
prosecutor did not find any new evidence of the acquitted individual's
guilt, they may be satisfied with forcing the individual to undergo
additional embarrassment, anxiety, concern, and expense arising from
the continued investigation.
168. Cf Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (the State of Missouri charged an
individual with robbing each of six participants in a poker game and after he was tried
and acquitted of robbing one participant the State tried him for robbing a second
participant); Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) (per curiam) (in separate indictments, the
State of Illinois charged an individual with murdering his wife and three children and
tried him three separate times, first for the murder of his wife, then for the murder of one
of his daughters, and finally for the murder of his son-gaining convictions in each
trial-until it obtained the sentence it wanted, the death penalty); Hoag v. New Jersey,
356 U.S. 464 (1958) (after the defendant was tried and acquitted of robbing three
individuals at a tavern, the State of New Jersey tried him for robbing a fourth person who
had been robbed in the same incident).
169. FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 4.
170. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 4.14 (emphasis
omitted).
171. SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THIRD REPORT, supra note 67, 19.
172. See id. See also FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 3-4 ("The main rationale of the
rule against double jeopardy is that it prevents the unwarranted harassment of the
accused by multiple prosecutions."); AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION
PAPER, supra note 39, at 2 (one of the policies underlying the rule against double
jeopardy is "the protection of citizens from harassment by the State"); NEW ZEALAND
LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 12 ("A fundamental purpose of the rule
against double jeopardy ... is to prevent the harassment of an accused by repeated
prosecution for the same matter.").
8. Maintaining the Public's Respect for, and
Confidence in, the Legal System
The rule against double jeopardy also "protect[s] ... the legal system
itself.' 73 As Professor Martin L. Friedland explains: "By preventing
harassment and inconsistent results, the rule assists in ensuring that court
proceedings.. . 'command the respect and confidence of the public."",1
74
The public would almost certainly lose respect for the legal system if the
government were allowed to repeatedly try an individual for the same
offense, despite repeated acquittals. In most cases, the public would
perceive the multiple prosecutions as government harassment. 75  In
addition, if the government ultimately obtained a conviction after a
previous acquittal, the inconsistent verdicts could affect the public's
confidence in the accuracy of the legal system and dilute the moral force
of the criminal law 176 because it would "leave[] people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned.' ' 177 Professor Paul Roberts explained it
in these terms:
[C]riminal conviction and punishment can only hope to be legitimate for as long
as political authorities abide by the terms of the criminal justice deal [that has
been struck (or that has evolved) in England and Wales, allowing jury verdicts
to be set aside to accommodate successful defence appeals against convictions,
but not authorizing governments to invalidate jury acquittals]. 1 81 If governments
could accept or reject acquittal verdicts much as it suited them, criminal
proceedings would soon be exposed as a sham trial of guilt, and jury acquittal
would lose its current practical and symbolic meaning. Public confidence in
jury verdicts generally would be undermined, and government would have
assumed an ominously authoritarian jurisdiction. 179
173. FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 4; see also NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION,
REPORT 70, supra note 40, 14 ("A consequence of the rule against double jeopardy is
protection of the administration of justice itself.").
174. FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 4 (quoting Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254,
1353 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (Lord Devlin)).
175. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 14.
176. Id.
177. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
178. The same "criminal justice deal" has been struck, or has evolved, in the United
States (footnote added). Compare, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977)
(explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 "grants the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to
review 'all final decisions of the district courts,' both civil and criminal," which allows a
convicted defendant to appeal his conviction), and United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,
463-64 (1964) (holding that a defendant whose conviction is reversed by an appellate
court can be retried for the same offense without violating the double jeopardy provision
of the Fifth Amendment), with, e.g., United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (holding
that the acquittal of a defendant in a jury trial precluded his subsequent trial for the same
offense, because "[t]he verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed, on error
or otherwise, without putting him twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution").
179. Roberts, supra note 115, at 411.
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IV. THE ENGLISH EXCEPTION FOR "TAINTED ACQUITTALS"
To determine whether Parliament acted wisely when it created the
tainted acquittal exception contained in the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996180 one must examine that exception in light of
the policies underlying the rule against double jeopardy. At first glance,
it seems logical to conclude that the law should recognize an exception
to the guarantee against double jeopardy when an individual's acquittal
was tainted by improper conduct. For why should an individual who
committed one crime be able to avoid conviction and punishment for
that crime by committing a further offense?'18  Nevertheless, upon
further examination, that conclusion may not be as self evident as it
initially seemed, and may be justifiable, if at all, only with significant
limitations.
A. Purposes and Rationale of the "Tainted Acquittal"
Exception to the Rule Against Double Jeopardy
The tainted acquittal provisions of the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996182 serve two major purposes. First, like a criminal
statute prohibiting and punishing certain conduct, 183 these provisions are
180. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54-57 (Eng.). For a
discussion of the provisions of the Act, see supra text accompanying notes 43-61.
181. Amar & Marcus, supra note 151, at 55 ("If a defendant on trial for murder
bribes his jury and wins acquittal, and ... the double jeopardy principle absolutely bar[s]
retrial for murder[,] ...the defendant will have, in a sense, gotten away with murder
simply by compounding his crime with bribery"); NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION,
REPORT 70, supra note 40, 4 (stating that "[a] likely result" in the case of Kevin Moore,
see supra text accompanying notes 20-33, "was that, by reason of a second crime,
conspiracy to pervert the course ofjustice, for which he is eligible to apply for release on
parole after two years and four months, Mr. Moore escaped conviction for an earlier
crime of murder, which carries a minimum non-parole period of ten years or more."
(footnotes omitted)).
182. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54-57 (Eng.).
183. E.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (stating that one of the
"traditional aims of punishment" is "deterrence" (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963))); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 779
(1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he basic goals of punishment [are] deterrence,
incapacitation, just deserts, [and] rehabilitation ...." (emphasis added)); Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997) ("[T]he two primary objectives of criminal
punishment [are] retribution [and] deterrence." (emphasis added)); Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364, 370 (1986) (stating that one of the "traditional aims of punishment" is
"deterrence" (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168)); WILLIAMS, supra note 16,
at 37 ("[T]he utilitarian reason for punishment is either its effect upon the person
punished (particular deterrence) or by serving as a warning to others (general
intended to deter individuals-in this case, criminal defendants and those
acting on their behalf-from interfering with or intimidating a juror,
witness, or potential witness in a criminal prosecution. By allowing the
High Court to quash an acquittal obtained through such improper
conduct and permitting the government to retry the acquitted individual
for the same offense, these provisions seek to assure that an accused
does not benefit from such improper conduct, thereby deterring such
behavior.184 Second, and most importantly, these provisions attempt to
"bring[] wrongdoers to justice."'8 5 Under the traditional rule against double
jeopardy, a factually guilty individual who obtained an acquittal through
illegitimate conduct, like any other acquitted individual, cannot be retried
for the same offense. 8 6 As a result, such an offender goes unpunished.'87
In contrast, the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 188 allows
the government to retry the individual for the offense of which he was
previously acquitted, thereby protecting the public interest by preserving
the government's "right to one full and fair opportunity to convict those
who have violated its laws."'189
deterrence).").
184. Anthony Edwards, The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996: Part
2: The Procedural Aspects, 1997 CRIM. L.R. 321, 329 (Crim.).
185. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY PAPER 42, supra note 20, T 9;
see also Ford, supra note 13 (reporting that U.K. Home Secretary Michael Howard
unveiled a bill to allow retrials of an individual acquitted because of nobbling of a juror
or witness and defended the decision to allow retrials in such cases on the grounds that
"[i]t is a[] . ..change ... absolutely necessary in the interests of justice. Otherwise
someone continues to go scot-free because they have managed to interfere with a juror or
witness." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
186. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 5; but see
People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (creating an exception to the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and holding that an individual
previously acquitted of murder in a bench trial could be retried for the same offense
because he had obtained that acquittal by bribing the trial judge), affg Nos. 93 CR
28786, 93 CR 28787, 1994 WL 684499 (I11. Cir. Ct. Oct. 12, 1994) (interim ruling on
defendant's motion to dismiss indictments); see also Aleman v. Honorable Judges of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming the denial of
habeas corpus relief to an individual being retried following his acquittal in a bench trial
for murder, allegedly obtained through bribery), aff'g sub nom. United States ex rel.
Aleman v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. I11. 1997).
187. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 20; see also
Amar & Marcus, supra note 151, at 55.
188. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54-57 (Eng.).
189. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 502 (1984) (emphasis added); see also Schiro
v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 231 (1994) ("The state is entitled to one fair opportunity to
prosecute a defendant .... (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added));
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 682 (1982) (Stevcns, J., concurring in judgment)
("[S]ociety[] [has an] interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to
present his evidence to the jury." (emphasis added)); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497, 505 (1978) ("[T]he public [has an] interest in affording the prosecutor one full and
fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury." (emphasis added)).
[VOL. 9: 217, 2008] Retrying the Acquitted in England
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
In any criminal justice system, a trial is an attempt to determine
whether the defendant actually committed the offense with which he is
charged. Despite its best efforts, the fact finder sometimes reaches the
"wrong" result1 90 and acquits a factually guilty person. 19' Nevertheless,
society is willing to tolerate such occasional factual errors' 92 and, through
the rule against double jeopardy, prohibit retrial of the "erroneously"
acquitted defendant for the same offense. This may not be the case,
however, when the fact finder's error resulted not from an honest
mistake or generally applicable limitations on the admission of certain
evidence, 93 but rather because of criminal conduct by the accused or
190. As United States Supreme Court Justice John M. Harlan 1I explained, "in a
judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of some earlier event, the
factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead,
all the factfinder can acquire is a belief of what probably happened .... [T]he trier of
fact will sometimes, despite [its] best efforts, be wrong in [its] factual conclusions." In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also id. at 364
(majority opinion) ("There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in
factfinding ....").
191. In a criminal prosecution, "a factual error can make a difference in one of two
ways[:] it can result in a judgment in favor of the [government] when the true facts
warrant a judgment for the defendant," Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring),
that is, the fact finder "convict[s] ... an innocent man," id. at 370-71, or it "can result in a
judgment for the defendant when the true facts justify a judgment in [the government's]
favor," id. at 371, that is, the fact finder "acquit[s] ... a guilty man." Id.
192. Indeed, by requiring the government to prove a criminal defendant's guilt
"beyond a reasonable doubt," Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; Woolmington v. DPP, [1935]
A.C. 462, 481-82 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at
42-43, common law jurisdictions, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 16, § 341,
at 571 ("[The standard of proof] 'beyond a reasonable doubt' .. . is now accepted in
common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must
convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt."), attempt to minimize the
number of erroneous convictions of innocent people, see Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 ("The
reasonable-doubt standard ... is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions
resting on factual error."), at the cost of increasing the risk that the fact finder will
erroneously acquit a factually guilty defendant, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
208 (1977) ("The social cost of placing the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt is ... an increased risk that the guilty will go free.").
193. Rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule, e.g., Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 2,
§ 114(1) (Eng.); FED. R. EvID. 802, and the attorney-client privilege, see ARCHBOLD,
supra note 18, §§ 12-7 to 12-21; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981);
see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (marital privilege), may
preclude the fact finder from hearing certain relevant information, thereby increasing the
chances of the fact finder making a factual error, as may other limitations on the
admissibility of concededly relevant evidence, e.g., Police and Criminal Evidence Act,
1984, c. 60, § 78(1) (Eng.) ("In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence
on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that,
having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was
someone acting on his behalf. As Professor Ian Dennis has stated"[a]n
acquittal procured by criminal offences against the adjudicative process
itself plainly lacks moral authority and has a very substantial question
mark over its factual accuracy." 94 Under such circumstances, "[a] retrial is
needed to resolve the issue of legitimacy."'1 95 Moreover, by prohibiting a
second trial in such situations, the traditional rule against double jeopardy
"bring[s] the law into disrepute"' 96 "by infringing.., the rule... that
witnesses must give honest evidence and everyone must refrain from
interfering with the procedures established for the honest administration
of justice" 197-a rule deemed "critical to the integrity of [the] judicial
processes" 198 in Anglo-American systems of law. As a result, "public
confidence in the administration of justice is likely to be undermined
when offenders are permitted to benefit from their own abuse of the
criminal justice system."'1 99
Two theories have been relied upon to justify a tainted acquittal
exception to the traditional rule against double jeopardy. The first theory
posits that an individual who obtains an acquittal through illegitimate
means should not be allowed to take advantage of such misdeeds and
"forfeits ' 2°° any claim that his previous acquittal bars his subsequent
obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the
fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.") (emphasis added);
SPRACK, supra note 38, § 3.2-3.9 (discussing the discretion of the trial judge to exclude
evidence on the basis of a violation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that a state cannot use in its case-in-
chief evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966) (holding, inter alia, that the government cannot use in its case-in-chief
incriminating statements obtained from the accused during custodial interrogation that
was not preceded by certain warnings).
194. Dennis, supra note 115, at 949.
195. Id.; accord Ian Dennis, Prosecution Appeals and Retrials for Serious Offences,
2004 CvMm. L.R. 619, 629-30 (Eng.); see also AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION
PAPER, supra note 39, at iv ("The integrity of the criminal justice system requires a valid
trial to be carried out.").
196. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 18.
197. Id. 19.
198. Id.
199. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY PAPER 42, supra note 20, 19.
200. An individual who interferes with or intimidates a juror, witness, or potential
witness to obtain an acquittal cannot be said to have "waived" his protection against
double jeopardy because a "waiver" constitutes "a voluntary, informed and unequivocal
election by a party not to claim a right or raise an objection which it is open to that party
to claim or raise," Millar v. Dickson, [2001] UKPC D4, [31], [2002] 3 All E.R. 1041
(appeal taken from Scot.) (emphasis added), or as the United States Supreme Court has
held, a waiver requires "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (defining waiver of a
constitutional right) (emphasis added); accord Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191
(1957) ("In any normal sense, [the term 'waiver'] connotes some kind of voluntary
knowing relinquishment of a right" (emphasis added)); see also Schneckloth v.
260
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prosecution for the same offense.20 According to this theory, a second trial
for the same offense does not create any undue hardship to the defendant,
for "[a] defendant who is proved to have deliberately corrupted the first
trial in his favour has no standing to complain of the distress to which a
retrial will expose him. 202 In such a case, "[t]here is no [protected] interest
in finality.' 20 3 The New Zealand Law Commission204 put it in these terms:
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1973) ("[T]he standard of a knowing and intelligent
waiver has ... been applied . . . to assess the effectiveness of a waiver of... trial rights
such as ... the right to be free from twice being placed in jeopardy."). One who
procures an acquittal though illegitimate means may not have made an "informed" or
"knowing" decision to relinquish his protection against double jeopardy. See Green, 355
U.S. at 191-92 (applying Johnson's definition in concluding that a defendant implicitly
acquitted of a greater-inclusive offense by being convicted of a lesser-included offense
did not "waive" his right to be free of double jeopardy with respect to the greater offense
by appealing his conviction of the lesser-included offense, because "'[u]sually no such
waiver is expressed or thought of" (quoting Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135
(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added)).
One may also view it in terms of estoppel. That is, a defendant who obtains an
acquittal through improper means is "estopped" from raising that acquittal to bar his
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (8th
ed. 2004) (defining "estoppel" as "[a] bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or
right that contradicts what one has said or done before").
201. David S. Rudstein, Double Jeopardy and the Fraudulently-Obtained Acquittal,
60 Mo. L. REv. 607, 641 (1995); see also Amar & Marcus, supra note 151, at 55 ("Call
it what you will-estoppel, fraud, unclean hands, waiver, or forfeiture-the basic idea,
rooted in general legal principles, is that a defendant's own prior misconduct bars him
from asserting a double jeopardy claim."); Dennis, supra note 195, at 630 ("A defendant
who interferes with or intimidates a witness or juror in a criminal trial forfeits the moral
claim.. . to benefit from an acquittal in the trial."); cf Anne Bowen Poulin, Double
Jeopardy and Judicial Accountability: When Is an Acquittal Not an Acquittal?, 27 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 953, 989 (1995) ("A defendant who tampers with the process by bribing a judge
may be seen as relinquishing any claim to a protected interest in the finality of the fact
finder's verdict or in the termination of the stress and anxiety of trial. The courts should
treat the defendant's conduct as consent to the subsequent retrial it necessitates.").
202. Dennis, supra note 115, at 949-50; accord Dennis, supra note 195, at 630; see
also id. ("It is a contradiction of the ethical principle for a defendant to claim a moral
entitlement to benefit from an acquittal when it follows his wrongful interference with
the process of the decision.").
203. Dennis, supra note 115, at 950; cf Poulin, supra note 201, at 989 ("A defendant
who tampers with the process by bribing a judge may be seen as relinquishing any claim
to a protected interest in the finality of the fact finder's verdict .... ").
204. The Law Commission is a body comprising no fewer than three and no more
than six members established by the New Zealand Parliament in 1985. Law Commission
Act 1985, § 9, 1985 S.N.Z. No. 151. Its members are appointed by the Governor-General on
the recommendation of the Cabinet. E-mail from Margaret Thompson, Special Projects
Advisor, N.Z. Law Comm'n, to author (Feb. 14, 2007, 20:18 CST) (on file with author).
The principal functions of the Commission are:
By intentionally misleading the court, or otherwise perverting the course of
justice and securing an acquittal, an individual deliberately destroys a fundamental
objective of the justice system: to conduct an untainted trial. Should such a
person then obtain the protection of the double jeopardy rule and the interests it
promotes? Some form of an exception to the rule may be less objectionable
when viewed this way. An accused can reasonably expect to be subjected to the
criminal prosecution system only once for an offence, provided he or she has
not deliberately perverted the first process.
20 5
The second theory used to justify an exception to traditional double
jeopardy principles posits that a defendant whose acquittal resulted from
improper means was never in "jeopardy" 20 6 or "peril"'20 7 at his first
trial20 8 because jeopardy or peril, for purposes of the rule against double
jeopardy, "entails the 'potential or risk of trial and conviction.' 20 9
(a) To take and keep under review in a systematic way the law of New Zealand;
(b) To make recommendations for the reform and development of the law of
New Zealand;
(c) To advise on the review of any aspect of the law of New Zealand conducted by
any Government department or organisation... and on proposals made as
a result of the review;
(d) To advise the Minister of Justice and the responsible Minister on ways in
which the law of New Zealand can be made as understandable and
accessible as practicable.
Law Commission Act 1985, § 5, 1985 S.N.Z. No. 151.
205. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY PAPER 42, supra note 20, 36.
206. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees that
"[n]o person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
207. The English Law Commission stated that "[t]he doctrines of autrefois acquit
and autrefois convict state that no-one may be put in peril twice for the same offence."
ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 2.2 (emphasis added).
208. People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615, 625-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (creating an
exception to the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy and holding that an
individual previously acquitted of murder in a bench trial could be retried for the same
offense because he had obtained that acquittal by bribing the trial judge), aff'g Nos. 93
CR 28786, 93 CR 28787, 1994 WL 684499 (Il. Cir. Ct. Oct. 12, 1994) (interim ruling
on defendant's motion to dismiss indictments); Amar & Marcus, supra note 15 1, at 55.
209. Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 310 (1984) (quoting
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970)); see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528
(1975) ("Jeopardy denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk
that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution."); Serfass v. United States,
420 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1975) ("Without risk of determination of guilt, jeopardy does not
attach ....").
In the United States, jeopardy normally attaches, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment,
when the defendant is "put to trial before the trier of facts," id. at 388 (quoting United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)), in a court "having
jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Id. at 391
(quoting Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904)). In a jury trial, this occurs
when "the jury is empaneled and sworn," Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978); United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977); in a bench trial, it occurs
when the judge begins to hear evidence, Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 27 n.3
(1977); Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 569; Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388, which occurs
when the first witness is sworn. Crist, 437 U.S. at 32-33. See generally RUDSTEIN, supra
note 18, at 66-71. In England, the autrefois rule applies only following a trial that ends
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According to this view, the defendant, due to the improper conduct
leading to his acquittal, never faced the risk of conviction in his first
trial,2 1° so a second trial would not place him in "double" jeopardy.2 1'
On the contrary, the defendant is arguably still in jeopardy, or peril, of
a conviction even though he, or some third person, bribed or intimidated
one or more jurors to vote for his acquittal regardless of the evidence
and sought to have the juror or jurors persuade the other jurors to acquit
the defendant. The same is true when the defendant, or some third
person, engaged in improper conduct to persuade one or more witnesses
either to commit perjury by testifying favorably to the accused at his trial
or not to appear at the trial. 212
For example, if a defendant bribed two jurors to acquit without regard
to the evidence, those two jurors might not succeed in persuading any
other jurors, and, in England and some states in the United States, he
might therefore be convicted by a vote of 10-2.2I3 Even if the defendant
bribed or intimidated a sufficient number of jurors to acquit him, he
would not be assured of an acquittal because some, or perhaps all, of
those bribed or intimidated jurors might change their minds before
reaching a verdict and join with a sufficient number of disinterested
in an acquittal or a conviction. Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254, 1305-06 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest); ARCHBOLD, supra note
18, § 4-117; ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 2.2, 2.47;
WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 164.
210. As Professor Akhil Reed Amar and Jonathan L. Marcus put it, "[i]f the jury
was bribed, the defendant was never truly in jeopardy. The fix was in, and he ran no
risk, suffered no jeopardy." Amar & Marcus, supra note 15 1, at 55.
211. As the Supreme Court of the United States stated in Serfass, 420 U.S. at 393, it
is a "fundamental principle that an accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer
double jeopardy."
212. See Rudstein, supra note 201, at 638-40.
213. In England, the Juries Act 1974 permits non-unanimous verdicts in criminal
prosecutions in the Crown Court or the High Court. Juries Act, 1974, c. 23, § 17(1)
(Eng.) (providing that "in a case where there are not less than eleven jurors, ten of them
[must] agree on the verdict," and "in a case where there are ten jurors, nine of them
[must] agree on the verdict"). In the United States, two states allow non-unanimous
verdicts. E.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (2007) ("Cases in which punishment
is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve
jurors, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict."); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("[l]n the
circuit court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save
and except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a
unanimous verdict, and not otherwise .... ).
In those jurisdictions that require a unanimous verdict, a 10-2 vote would result in a
mistrial because of a hung jury, and the government could retry the defendant for the
same offense. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
jurors to convict. 214 In neither of these situations could it be argued that,
because the defendant, or a third person, bribed or intimidated the jurors
prior to trial, the defendant was never in jeopardy or peril at his trial for
he, in fact, was convicted.215
It is even clearer that an accused who bribes or intimidates a witness
to testify falsely or not to appear at the defendant's trial is still in
"jeopardy," or "peril," once his trial begins. As with a bribed juror,
the witness might undergo a change of heart after the commencement of
trial and testify truthfully to facts implicating the accused in the charged
crime. The fact finder might then rely upon that testimony, along with
other evidence introduced by the prosecutor at trial, to convict the
accused. But even if the bribed or intimidated witness keeps his bargain
and falsely testifies favorably to the accused or fails to appear, the
accused has no assurance that the fact finder will acquit him. Rather, in
the former situation, the fact finder might discount the witness's false
testimony and rely on the other evidence presented by the prosecutor to
convict the accused. In the latter situation, the fact finder might rely on
the evidence presented at trial to convict the accused.
Thus, even in a case in which the defendant, or some third person,
bribes or intimidates one or more jurors or witnesses in an attempt to
secure an acquittal, the defendant still runs the risk-albeit a lesser
one-of being convicted, and hence, like any other defendant, should be
214. Cf United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1995) (judge in a
bench trial took a $10,000 bribe to fix a murder trial but, because he suspected that the
FBI had learned about the scheme, he returned the money during the trial and convicted
the two defendants of murder instead of acquitting them as he originally had agreed to
do); People v. Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d 999, 1001-04 (Ill. 1998) (reciting the facts which
were the basis for both the Hawkins and Maloney cases and the procedural history of
Maloney).
215. Cf Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) ("One cannot be placed in
'jeopardy' by a void indictment, the state argues. This argument sounds a bit strange,
however, since petitioner could quietly have served out his sentence under this 'void'
indictment .... ).
Of course, a conviction obtained in a trial in which the defendant or some third person
bribed or intimidated one or more jurors to acquit the defendant might be reversed, not
because the corrupt jurors were unable to persuade their fellow jurors or because they
failed to carry through on their promise to vote to acquit the accused, but rather on the
ground that, because of the jury tampering, the accused did not receive a fair trial.
United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446, 456-59 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that a
convicted defendant may not have received a trial by a fair and impartial jury because of
attempted jury tampering and stating that "[iut makes no difference in this case that it
was [the defendant] himself who initiated the contact that may have poisoned the jury");
cf Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d at 1003-06 (granting a new trial to an individual convicted of
murder in a bench trial on the ground that he was denied due process of law because,
after he bribed the trial judge to acquit him, the judge backed out of the deal and returned
the bribe money; rejecting the prosecution's argument that the defendant could not
benefit from his own illegal conduct, i.e., that he did not have "clean hands").
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deemed to be in jeopardy or peril for purposes of the rule against
double jeopardy.216
B. The "Tainted Acquittal" Exception in Light of the Policies
Underlying the Rule Against Double Jeopardy
At the outset, it should be noted that a tainted acquittal exception to
the rule against double jeopardy will not thwart the rule's purpose of
encouraging efficient investigation and prosecution of crimes. 217 When
police are investigating a suspect and prosecutors are preparing for a
criminal trial, neither has any means of knowing whether the person
in question, or someone acting on his behalf, will attempt to bribe, intimidate,
or otherwise improperly influence a juror, witness, or potential witness.
In fact, the likelihood that any particular investigation or prosecution
will ultimately result in a "tainted" acquittal remains extremely low.
Consequently, police and prosecutors can never be sure they will get a
"second bite at the cherry,' 8 and therefore will have every incentive to
put forth their best efforts to investigate and convict from the outset.
Nor does a tainted acquittal exception impinge upon any of the other
purposes of the rule against double jeopardy when applied to a previously
acquitted individual who in fact obtained his acquittal through his own
criminal conduct, or the criminal conduct of another person acting at his
behest 19 or with his knowledge.22° It is not unfair to require a previously-
216. But cf Aleman v. Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138
F.3d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1998) (in affirming the denial of habeas corpus relief to an
individual being retried following his acquittal in a bench trial for murder, allegedly
obtained through bribery, the court stated that the individual "may be correct that some
risk of conviction still existed after [the trial judge] agreed to fix the case," but concluded
that "it cannot be said that the risk was the sort 'traditionally associated' with an
impartial criminal justice system").
217. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of encouraging
efficient investigation and prosecution, see supra text accompanying notes 162-67.
218. Dennis, supra note 164, at 927.
219. See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, supra note 12 (announcing
that an individual had been convicted of the witness-tampering murder of a young
woman for ordering her killing so she could not be a witness against him and his criminal
associates at their trial for various offenses); see also The Queen v. Moore, [1999]
N.Z.C.A. 274 (C.A.), [4] (discussed supra text accompanying notes 20-33) (Moore, who
was charged with murder, and a fellow gang member agreed that the latter would commit
perjury at the defendant's trial to explain away evidence incriminating Moore in the
killing), available at http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZCA/I999/274.html.
220. For example, in the case involving Harry Aleman, a reputed assassin for the
Chicago crime syndicate, see infra text accompanying notes 260-80, prosecutors believed that
a $10,000 bribe paid to the trial judge to acquit Aleman of a murder charge originated
acquitted individual to undergo a second trial for the same offense when
he personally engaged in or orchestrated criminal conduct to procure his
acquittal.22' Such a person has no protected interest in the finality of the
judgment in his favor; 222 nor can he legitimately complain about having
to suffer the "distress and trauma of the trial process" 223 a second time
for the same offense 224 because he himself brought about the need for a
second trial. Accordingly, it can fairly be said that by engaging in the
improper conduct he forfeited his protection against double jeopardy.225
The same is true when a tainted acquittal exception is applied to an
individual who, either before or during his trial, knew about a third
party's criminal conduct that interfered with the fact finder or a witness
or potential witness and that ultimately led to his acquittal. In such a
case, had the individual spoken up, the trial judge226 could have dealt
with the matter immediately, by notifying the prosecutor and delaying
the start of the trial while she investigated the individual's allegations,
or, if trial had already commenced, by declaring a mistrial.227 On the
with members of the Chicago mob who wanted Aleman back on the streets, where he
could be of continued service to them. John O'Brien, Exception to Double Jeopardy,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1994, § 1, at 20. Nevertheless, the evidence in that case indicates
that Aleman knew about the bribe. People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (concluding that the evidence adduced at a pretrial hearing on the defendant's
motion to dismiss a murder indictment on double jeopardy grounds permitted a fact
finder to conclude that, prior to his first trial for the offense, the defendant told a
bookmaker that "his murder indictment 'was all taken care of,"' and that "he was going
to request a bench trial 'because the case was all taken care of").
221. See supra text accompanying notes 200-05.
222. Dennis, supra note 115, at 950; see also Poulin, supra note 201, at 989 ("A
defendant who tampers with the process by bribing a judge may be seen as relinquishing
any claim to a protected interest in the finality of the fact finder's verdict .... ). For a
discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of maintaining the finality of
judgments, see supra text accompanying notes 103-20.
223. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36, 4.7.
224. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of minimizing
the distress and trauma of the trial process, see supra text accompanying notes 121-33.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 200-01, 204-05.
226. Of course, if the improper conduct involved a bribe paid to the trial judge, see
People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615, 618 (II1. App. Ct. 1996), the individual could have
informed someone else, such as the supervising judge of the court or the prosecutor, who
could then have taken the appropriate action.
227. Neither action by the trial judge would raise a double jeopardy bar to further
proceedings against the individual for the crime with which he was charged. England's
autrefois rules apply only following a trial that ends in an acquittal or a conviction,
Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254, 1305-06 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)
(Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest); ARCHBOLD, supra note 18, § 4-117; ENGLISH LAW
COMMISSION, REPORT No. 267, supra note 18, 2.2, 2.47; WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at
164, so a judge's postponement of a trial or declaration of a mistrial based upon a third
person's interference with a juror, witness, or potential witness would not bar the
government from trying or retrying the individual for the same offense. In the United
States, jeopardy does not attach until the defendant is "'put to trial before the trier of the
facts,"' Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975) (quoting United States v.
[VOL. 9: 217, 2008] Retrying the Acquitted in England
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
other hand, by remaining silent, the individual acquiesced in the fraudulent
conduct that led to the "tainted acquittal." As a result, it can fairly be said
that he too forfeited his protection against double jeopardy228 and has
neither a protected "interest in finality,' 229 nor a legitimate complaint about
having to undergo the embarrassment, stress, and expense 230 of a second
trial for the same offense.
Similarly, a repeat prosecution of a previously-acquitted individual
whose acquittal resulted from his own fraudulent conduct, or that of a third
person acting at his behest or with his knowledge, would not constitute
harassment of that individual by the government. 23 Rather, the government
would merely be exercising "its right to one full and fair opportunity to
convict those who have violated its laws. 2 32 While a second prosecution
for the same offense would consume scarce prosecutorial and judicial
resources, 233 the need to allow the government a fair opportunity to
convict the individual justifies the use of those limited resources in the
Join, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)), which does not occur in a jury trial
until the jury has been selected and sworn, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36-38 (1978);
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977), and in a bench trial
until the judge begins to hear evidence. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 27 n.3 (1977);
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 569; Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388. In addition, the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the government from trying an individual a second
time for the same offense when his first trial ended in a mistrial declared because of
fraud, such as when he knowingly presented perjured testimony, e.g., McKissick v.
United States, 398 F.2d 342, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1968) (dictum); Salter v. State, 795 So. 2d
168, 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Reid, 479 N.W.2d 572, 574-76 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1991), or tampered with a juror, e.g., State v. Sanders, 496 S.E.2d 568, 573-74
(N.C. 1998) (dictum); State v. Cutshall, 180 S.E.2d 745, 752-53 (N.C. 1971); Plunkett v.
State, 883 S.W.2d 349, 354-55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). For in such situations a "manifest
necessity" existed for termination of the trial, McKissick, 398 F.2d at 343-44; Salter, 795
So. 2d at 168; Sanders, 496 S.E.2d at 573-74; Cutshall, 180 S.E.2d at 751-53; Plunkett,
883 S.W.2d at 354-55; Reid, 479 N.W.2d at 574-76, and it has long been held that the
double jeopardy provision does not prohibit a retrial following a mistrial declared over
the defendant's objection when a "manifest necessity" existed for termination of the trial
before verdict. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); accord
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,
505, 506 n.18 (1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461 (1973); Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684, 689-90 (1949); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 154 (1891).
228. See supra note 200 and text accompanying notes 200-05.
229. Dennis, supra note 115, at 950.
230. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
231. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of preventing
harassment of an individual by the government, see supra text accompanying notes 170-
72.
232. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 502 (1984) (emphasis added).
233. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of conserving
scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources, see supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
particular case, especially if the underlying offense is serious. The second
trial inevitably provides the government an opportunity to "hon[e] its
trial strategies and perfect[] its evidence" 234 based on what it learned at
the first trial 235 and may also wear down the individual financially,
emotionally, and physically. 236 Both of these factors, as well as others,
237
may increase the government's chances of convicting the individual in the
second trial, despite his possible innocence.238 However, an individual
who obtained an acquittal through fraudulent conduct, or that of a third
person acting at his behest or with his knowledge, has no standing to
complain about the government's increased chances of convicting him
at his second trial because he bears responsibility for the second trial.
Moreover, when members of a jury are bribed or intimidated by the
accused or by someone acting at his command or with his knowledge, it
is highly unlikely that a verdict of not guilty returned by that jury would
be an exercise of its power to acquit against the evidence.2 39 Rather, the
acquittal almost certainly would have resulted either entirely, or in large
part, from the bribe or intimidation. Similarly, it is unlikely that an acquittal
obtained through the bribery or intimidation of a witness or potential
witness involved nullification of the law by the fact finder. Even if the
jury acquitted against the evidence, it presumably did so in light of the
evidence it heard at trial. That evidence may have misled the fact finder.
This may be because it resulted from perjured testimony induced through
bribery or intimidation, or because the evidence was incomplete due to
the absence of one or more potential witnesses who failed to appear
because they had been bribed or intimidated to go into hiding or to leave
the jurisdiction. Had the jury heard all the relevant facts, including the
234. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982); see also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S.
508, 518 (1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688
(1993); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980); United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 139-46.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 138, 150-5 1.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 134-51.
Although it is unlikely that a defendant who procured his acquittal through his own
fraudulent conduct, or that of others acting at his behest or with his knowledge, is
factually innocent of the crime with which he was charged, there may be cases in which
a factually innocent defendant might fear that the fact finder will erroneously convict
him, either because of strong circumstantial evidence against him or because of prejudice. He
therefore might engage in improper conduct to prevent an erroneous conviction. See
United States v. Forrest, 620 F. 2d 446, 458 (5th Cir. 1980) ("It is conceivable that a
defendant, innocent of the charged being tried, might attempt to tamper with a jury to
assure a favorable verdict.").
239. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of protecting the
power of the jury to acquit against the evidence, see supra text accompanying notes 152-
61.
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truthful testimony of those witnesses who perjured themselves or who
failed to appear at the trial, it is not certain that the jury would have
nullified the law and acquitted the defendant. Consequently, allowing a
retrial of the individual for the same offense following a tainted acquittal
would be unlikely to interfere with the policy of protecting the jury's
power to acquit against the evidence.240
Finally, allowing the government to retry a previously-acquitted individual
who procured his acquittal through fraudulent conduct, or who knew
about another person's improper conduct that led to his acquittal, would
not be likely to reduce the public's respect for the legal system.241
Because of the taint that permeated the first trial, it is unlikely that the
public would view the second trial as an attempt by the government to
harass the acquitted individual. Even if the second trial resulted in the
individual's conviction, the public probably would not consider the two
different results to be inconsistent with one another. Rather, they most
likely would see one-the acquittal-as the result of a trial tainted by
fraudulent conduct, while it would see the other-the conviction-as the
result of a fair trial by an impartial fact finder. Indeed, one could persuasively
argue that the refusal to allow a second trial for the same offense when an
individual's acquittal was tainted by fraudulent conduct would cause the
242public to lose respect for, and confidence in, the legal system.
Nevertheless, although a tainted acquittal exception to the rule against
double jeopardy does not frustrate any of the purposes of the rule against
double jeopardy when applied to a previously-acquitted individual who
in fact procured his acquittal through criminal conduct, the tainted acquittal
exception contained in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
1996243 is not limited to such individuals. Rather, it can apply whenever
"a person has been convicted of an administration of justice offence
involving interference with or intimidation of a juror or a witness (or
potential witness) in any proceedings which led to the acquittal" 244 in
question. The Act does not require that the acquitted individual have
240. A judge in a bench trial can acquit against the evidence. See supra note 160.
Nevertheless, the reasoning in the text would also apply when the individual's previous
acquittal occurred in a bench trial.
241. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of maintaining
the public's respect for, and confidence in, the legal system, see supra text accompanying
notes 173-79.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 193-99.
243. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54-57 (Eng.).
244. Id. § 54(l)(b) (emphasis added).
participated in the criminal conduct that tainted his acquittal or even
have known about it. Yet, unless the individual had such knowledge, either
before or during his trial, it is unreasonable to conclude that he "forfeited"
his protection against double jeopardy and therefore should be estopped
from raising the acquittal as a bar to a second prosecution for the same
offense.245
Take for example a situation in which a defendant's friends are
convinced of the defendant's innocence but are also deeply concerned
about his being erroneously convicted. In an effort to attain his acquittal
they, unbeknownst to the accused, bribe a key government witness to
leave the jurisdiction so he cannot testify at the defendant's trial.246
Suppose further that the absence of this witness's testimony weakens the
government's case enough so that the fact finder acquits. Although the
accused certainly benefited from the criminal conduct of his friends, he
did not know about their actions. After undergoing the "grueling ' 247
ordeal of a trial,248 and not engaging in, contributing to, or even knowing
about any improper conduct, why should he, as well as his family and
dependents, 249 not be entitled to consider the matter closed and be able to
put the matter behind him? 250 Any exception to the rule against double
245. See supra text accompanying notes 200-05.
246. See People v. Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d 999, 1001-04, 1005 n.2 (111. 1998)
(perhaps unbeknownst to a murder defendant, his co-defendant attempted to bribe the
trial judge in their joint bench trial).
247. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 13.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 124-29.
249. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
250. It is true that at least one situation exists in which traditional double jeopardy
law does not recognize the finality of an individual's acquittal and does not allow that
acquittal to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, despite the absence of any
"fault" on the acquitted individual's part. When an individual is acquitted of an offense in a
court lacking jurisdiction of either the offense or the person, that purported acquittal is
"in fact a nullity," R v. West, [1964] 1 Q.B. 15, 25 (Eng.); see also 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 37, at *335; HAWKINS, supra note 70, at 372, and is "absolutely void."
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896). Accordingly, it cannot bar a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. Nevertheless, in such situations, the individual,
through the efforts of his attorney, could have discovered the defect in the proceedings
before the start of his trial and could have moved to dismiss the charges or to transfer the
case to the proper court, as the case might be, thereby avoiding a meaningless trial. E.g.,
United States v. Khan, 822 F.2d 451, 454-55 (4th Cir. 1987) (by examining the
applicable rule of criminal procedure, defense counsel could have determined that the
trial court lost jurisdiction in the case when the defendant changed his plea from guilty to
not guilty); Rangel v. State, 456 S.E.2d 739, 739-40 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (by examining
the relevant statutes, defense counsel could have determined that the municipal court
lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged); State v. Mesman, 488 So. 2d 1296, 1297-
98 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (by examining the relevant case law, defense counsel could have
determined that the parish court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant because he was
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial). It therefore may not be unfair to permit the
government to retry the individual for the same offense, this time in a court having
jurisdiction, at least when the government was not acting in bad faith when it brought the
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jeopardy therefore should be limited to situations in which the defendant, at
a minimum, knew about the improper conduct leading to his acquittal,
either before or during his trial. 5 1
prosecution in the wrong court. See Commonwealth v. Keenan, 530 A.2d 90, 94 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987) ("We would agree that where there is evidence of the Commonwealth's
intentionally trying a defendant in a court which it knows or should know does not havejurisdiction, a subsequent prosecution is impermissible on the basis of the constitutional
guarantees against being placed twice in jeopardy. Otherwise, the Commonwealth
would be free to engage in vexatious pursuit of a pattern of harassment with no legal
limit to the number of prosecutions it could mount. Such a Kafkaesque scenario is not in
compliance with our constitutional strictures regulating the circumstances under which
an individual may be retried for the same offense."). As a result, this situation differs
from the one in which someone, unbeknownst to the defendant, engages in criminal
conduct that leads to the defendant's acquittal. Unfortunately, this attempted distinction
between the two situations fails when defense counsel unsuccessfully raises the issue ofjurisdiction in the trial court and, following the defendant's acquittal, a different court,
either on appeal or in a new prosecution brought by the government for the same offense,
concludes that the trial court in fact lacked jurisdiction over the offense or the defendant,
or both, and that the government can retry the defendant in a court having jurisdiction.
E.g., State v. Hamilton, 754 P.2d 857, 859 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (following the defendant's
acquittal on one count of an information and his conviction on another count, the
appellate court held that the defendant had been denied his constitutional right to counsel
at his preliminary hearing, which deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to try the case,
and that the government therefore could retry the defendant on both counts without
violating the double jeopardy provision, even though prior to trial defense counsel
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the defendant was
denied his right to counsel at his preliminary hearing). Fortunately, such a situation has
rarely arisen.
Of course, if it can be said that a previously-acquitted individual, because of
interference with or intimidation of a juror, witness, or potential witness at his trial, was
never in jeopardy or peril at that trial, see supra text accompanying notes 206-11, then a
retrial for the same offense should be permissible even if the defendant did not know
about the criminal conduct that "tainted" his acquittal. Such a result is extremely harsh,
however. For an individual who has in good faith undergone a criminal trial and has
suffered the embarrassment, anxiety, and expense of that trial is told that, despite the
absence of any improper conduct by him or any knowledge of improper conduct by
others, the acquittal he obtained will not be deemed final for double jeopardy purposes
and that he will again have to suffer through a trial for the same offense. As previously
explained, however, the Author believes that a defendant is still in jeopardy or peril at
his trial even though he or someone else tampered with the fact finder or a witness. See
supra text accompanying notes 212-16.
251. Apropos are the words used by the New Zealand Law Commission in excluding
from its recommendation for a tainted acquittal exception those situations in which a third
party, without the involvement of the accused, committed an administration of justice
offense: "While interference with the administration of justice is always a matter of
concern and sometimes of great gravity, in the case of an accused who has not been party
to it such conduct is simply a fortuity for which that accused cannot be blamed." NEW
ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 1 31.
It seems Professor Akhil Reed Amar and Jonathan L. Marcus would limit any
exception to the traditional rule against double jeopardy to situations in which the
In this respect, the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996252
is too broad and should be amended to encompass only those situations
in which the acquitted individual participated in, or knew about, the
intimidation of a juror, witness, or potential witness. Its current overbreadth,
however, is not a major cause for concern because it is unlikely to
ensnare many "innocent" individuals. As a practical matter, it is probable
that in nearly all situations involving a tainted acquittal the acquitted
defendants will have participated in or, at a minimum, have known
about the interference or intimidation that led to his acquittal.253
Retrying him for the same offense therefore will not be unfair and will
not frustrate the underlying purposes of the rule against double jeopardy
insofar as they apply to him.
Nevertheless, in examining an exception to the rule against double
jeopardy, one must look beyond the effect on those previously-acquitted
individuals whose acquittals resulted from improper conduct and instead
scrutinize the impact on those previously-acquitted individuals whose
defendant engaged in the misconduct. Amar & Marcus, supra note 151, at 55 ("[A]
defendant's own prior misconduct bars him from asserting a double jeopardy claim."
(emphasis added)). Professor Dennis, on the other hand, argues that retrial should be
permissible "[e]ven if the corruption was carried out by someone else," because "the
defendant has benefited from it, and it is hardly conceivable that the benefit could be
wholly innocent." Dennis, supra note 115, at 950. If the defendant were not "wholly
innocent," in the sense that he ordered or knew about the improper conduct-and the
government could prove it-the Author would have no quarrel with Professor Dennis.
But, as illustrated in the text, there may be circumstances in which the defendant did not
know about the improper conduct, despite the benefit it conferred upon him.
252. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54-57 (Eng.).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1173, 1177, 1179 (1 1th Cir.
2005) (an individual charged with numerous drug offenses bribed the jury foreman and
was acquitted of those offenses); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1191 (7th Cir.
1986) (an individual admitted that in a previous state prosecution for murder, he bribed
the trial judge to acquit him in a bench trial); People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615, 618
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (concluding that the evidence adduced at a pretrial hearing on the
defendant's motion to dismiss a murder indictment on double jeopardy grounds permitted a
fact finder to conclude that, prior to his first trial for the offense, the defendant told a
bookmaker that "his murder indictment 'was all taken care of"), aff'g Nos. 93 CR
28786, 93 CR 28787 1994 WL 684499 (111. Cir. Ct. Oct. 12, 1994) (interim ruling on
defendant's motion to dismiss indictments); R v. Allan, [2001] EWCA (Crim) 1027, [1],
[3]-[4], [6]-[7], [10]-[14], [19], [89], [2002] 1 Cr. App. R(S) 9 (Eng.) (in the appeal by
two individuals of their convictions for conspiring to pervert the course of justice by
bribing a juror in their previous trial for conspiracy to supply illegal drugs, the court
stated that a co-defendant in the drug conspiracy trial had been acquitted of that charge
and had pleaded guilty to doing acts to pervert the course of justice); R v. Boodhoo,
[2001] EWCA (Crim) 1027, [2]-[3], [2002] 1 Cr. App. R(S) 9, at 34 (the juror in a criminal
trial involving Allan pleaded guilty to having accepted £ 1000 from one of the defendants
in that trial). But see People v. Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d 999, 1001-04, 1005 n.2 (I11. 1998)
(perhaps unbeknownst to a murder defendant, his co-defendant attempted to bribe the
trial judge in their joint bench trial).
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acquittals did not result from illegitimate conduct.25 4 Doing so reveals
that a tainted acquittal exception can frustrate nearly all the purposes
underlying the rule against double jeopardy.
First, a tainted acquittal exception frustrates the double jeopardy rule's
purposes of maintaining the finality of judgments255 and minimizing the
"embarrassment, expense, and ordeal ' 25 6 of the trial process 25 7 because it
opens up every judgment of acquittal-whether or not the result of
fraud-to a subsequent challenge by the government.2 58 No acquitted
individual, even one acquitted on the basis of the evidence presented at
a trial uninfluenced by any type of improper conduct, could ever be
certain that his acquittal was final and that he could move on with his
life, assured that he would never again undergo the trauma and expense
of a second trial for the same offense. For at some future time-perhaps
even years later 259-the government could allege the initial acquittal was
"tainted" and seek a retrial for the same offense of which the defendant
was previously acquitted.
254. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 13 ("Any
proposal to reopen that process must recognise both the cost to the particular parties of
such course and the effect on parties to other cases of the possibility that, despite the
verdict, closure is incomplete." (emphasis added)).
255. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of maintaining
the finality ofjudgments, see supra text accompanying notes 103-20.
256. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
257. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of minimizing
the distress and trauma of the trial process, see supra text accompanying notes 121-33.
258. Cf FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 296 ("A further danger is that to concede a
right to appeal to the Crown in even a limited number of cases makes all acquittals
uncertain until the time for appeals goes by." (emphasis added)).
259. E.g., People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615, 617 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (sixteen
years after an individual was acquitted of murder, the State of Illinois charged him with
the same murder, claiming that he obtained the previous acquittal by bribing the trial
judge in a bench trial); cf Press Release, Crown Prosecution Serv., DPP Refers William
Dunlop Case to Court of Appeal as First Under Double Jeopardy Law, (Nov. 10, 2005)
(http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/pressreleases/archive/2005/158_05.html) (fourteen years after
an individual was acquitted of murder, the Director of Public Prosecutions gave his
consent for the Crown Prosecution Service to refer the case to the Court of Appeal, under
a newly-created exception to the rule against double jeopardy, to decide whether the
individual should be retried for the murder on the basis of "new and compelling
evidence"); BBC NEWS, New Tests on Lawrence Evidence, Nov. 8, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/uk news/7085242.stm (reporting that twelve years after three individuals were
acquitted of murder in a private prosecution, police were re-examining the evidence in
the case, apparently in an attempt to retry the acquitted individuals for the murder under
a recent exception to the rule against double jeopardy for "new and compelling
evidence").
260The case of Harry Aleman illustrates this point. In December of 1976,
the State of Illinois obtained an indictment charging Aleman, a reputed
"hit man" for the Chicago mob,261 with the 1972 murder of William Logan.
262
Aleman opted for a bench trial, and in May of 1977, the trial judge
found him not guilty.263 However, more than sixteen years later, in
December of 1993, the State of Illinois again charged Aleman with
Logan's murder, 264 claiming that Aleman's 1977 acquittal resulted from
a $10,000 bribe paid to the trial judge by a corrupt lawyer at the behest
of local politicians with ties to the crime syndicate. 265 By bringing the
charge, the government forced Aleman to defend himself a second time
for the same offense. Aleman hired an attorney, who moved to dismiss the
murder charge on the ground, inter alia, that it placed Aleman in
double jeopardy 266 in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.267 In October of
1994, the trial court rejected Aleman's legal argument that the double
jeopardy provision absolutely barred his retrial, regardless of whether
the judge in his first trial had been bribed,268 and ordered an evidentiary
hearing at which the government could attempt to prove its allegations
that Aleman's 1977 acquittal in fact resulted from bribery of the
judge.269 The trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing in February
of 1995 wherein both sides presented evidence, including the testimony
of various witnesses. 27° In March of 1995, the trial court, applying a
preponderance of the evidence standard,27' found that the judge in
Aleman's initial trial had been bribed to acquit Aleman and denied
Aleman's motion to dismiss the murder indictment on double jeopardy
grounds.272 Aleman immediately appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.2 3
In June of 1996, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision
260. The saga of Harry Aleman is recounted in MAURICE POSSLEY & RICK KOGAN,
EVERYBODY PAYS: Two MEN, ONE MURDER AND THE PRICE OF TRUTH (2001).
261. O'Brien, supra note 220, § 1, at 20.
262. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 617.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. O'Brien, supra note 220, § 1, at 20.
266. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 617.
267. See supra text accompanying note 72.
268. People v. Aleman, Nos. 93 CR 28786, 93 CR 28787, 1994 WL 684499, at *15
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 12, 1994) (interim ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss indictments).
269. Id. at*21.
270. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 617-20.
271. See Aleman v. Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138
F.3d 302, 306 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting the trial judge). Despite applying a preponderance of
the evidence standard, the trial judge concluded that the evidence presented by the
government convinced him beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
272. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 620.
273. Id. at 616.
[VOL. 9: 217, 2008] Retrying the Acquitted in England
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
refusing to dismiss the indictment, 27 4 finding, inter alia, that the trial
court's ruling "conclusively determined that there was sufficient evidence to
prove the bribery of [the judge at Aleman's first trial] and that Aleman
had committed the substantive offense of bribery."2  After Aleman's
unsuccessful attempts for direct review by the Supreme Court of Illinois
276
and the Supreme Court of the United States,2 77 he filed a petition for
habeas corpus and a motion to stay his murder trial. 78 In May of 1997
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
denied the petition and found that the motion to stay was moot. 279 While
Aleman appealed those decisions, he was tried in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, for Logan's murder, and in September of 1997,
nearly four years after being charged a second time with the murder, he
was convicted by a jury.280
The Aleman case shows what can happen today to any acquitted
criminal defendant in the State of Illinois.28' A prosecutor who honestly
believes that an individual's previous acquittal was "tainted" by some
type of fraudulent conduct can, without any judicial oversight, bring a
new charge against that individual for the same offense of which he was
previously acquitted. The prosecutor, of course, may be correct in her
belief that the individual fraudulently procured his acquittal, but on the
other hand, she may be mistaken, that is, she may honestly, but
erroneously, believe that the previous acquittal was "tainted" by fraud.
Moreover, a second prosecution can also be brought, without any judicial
oversight, by an unscrupulous prosecutor who knows that an individual's
previous acquittal was not obtained through improper conduct. The
prosecutor may, for instance, be motivated to bring the second charge by
a personal or political vendetta against the individual, the desire to
274. Id. at 627.
275. Id. at 626.
276. People v. Aleman, 671 N.E.2d 734 (Ill. 1996) (denying petition for leave to
appeal).
277. Aleman v. Illinois, 519 U.S. 1128 (1997) (denying petition for writ of
certiorari).
278. United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 967 F. Supp.
1022, 1024 (N.D. I1. 1997).
279. Id. at 1031.
280. Aleman v. Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F.3d
302, 304 (7th Cir. 1998).
281. The Author is not contending that Harry Aleman did not commit the murder
for which he was convicted or that his acquittal did not result from a bribe paid to the
trial judge. Whether he committed the murder and bribed the trial judge is irrelevant to
the subsequent analysis in the text.
enhance his reputation for an upcoming election in which he is a
candidate, or merely his belief that the fact finder in the individual's first
trial reached the "wrong" conclusion when it found the individual not
guilty. 282 Regardless of the prosecutor's motivation, however, once she
files the charge, the previously-acquitted individual must defend himself
a second time for the same offense. He most likely will begin by obtaining
an attorney283 and then, through his attorney, will file a motion to dismiss
the charge on double jeopardy grounds. After the individual shows that
his previous acquittal was for the same offense as the one currently
charged,284 the burden will shift to the government to show that the guarantee
against double jeopardy does not bar the second prosecution. 285 The
government will allege that the individual procured his initial acquittal
through his own fraudulent conduct, or the fraudulent conduct of another
person acting at his behest or with his knowledge. The individual will
respond by claiming that his previous acquittal represented a decision by
the fact finder based solely upon the evidence presented at his trial,
untainted by any fraudulent conduct. At that point, the trial court must
conduct an evidentiary hearing 286 at which the government must prove
282. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the State of Missouri charged an
individual with robbing each of six participants in a poker game. After the individual
was tried for robbing one of the participants and acquitted, the State tried him for
robbing a second participant in the poker game. Id. at 439. The case report does not
reveal the prosecutor's motive in bringing the individual to trial a second time. It is
likely, however, that he honestly believed that the jury in the individual's first trial
reached the wrong result and that, under the relevant case law, the second trial was
constitutionally permissible, see Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 467-72 (1958)
(holding that the State of New Jersey did not violate the Constitution when, after an
individual was acquitted of robbing three individuals at a tavern, it tried him for robbing
a fourth person who had been robbed in the same incident). Although the offenses
involved in Ashe were not the same for double jeopardy purposes, because they involved
different victims, the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, see supra text accompanying note 72, contains a collateral estoppel
component that barred the second trial in that case. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-47.
283. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[T]here are few defendants
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare
and present their defenses."). In the United States, an indigent person charged with
committing a felony is constitutionally entitled to have counsel appointed at the
government's expense. See supra note 126.
284. In attempting to establish a valid claim of double jeopardy, an accused must
initially establish a non-frivolous prima facie claim. E.g., Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S.
508, 522 n.14 (1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S.
688 (1993); United States v. Doyle, 121 F.3d 1078, 1089 (7th Cir. 1997); People v.
Stefan, 586 N.E.2d 1239, 1248 (Il1. 1992).
285. E.g., Grady, 495 U.S. at 522 n.14; Doyle, 121 F.3d at 1089; Stefan, 586 N.E.2d
at 1248.
286. E.g., United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Benefield, 874 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11 th Cir. 1989); cf State v. Canon, 622 N.W.2d 270,
278 (Wis. 2001) (holding that an individual relying upon the collateral estoppel
component of the guarantee against double jeopardy to bar a prosecution for perjury
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by a preponderance of the evidence 287 that the individual's previous
acquittal resulted from fraud, in which case, under Aleman,288 it would
not preclude the second prosecution for the same offense. Such an evidentiary
hearing almost certainly will involve the calling of witnesses and the
presentation of evidence by both the government and the individual.
In essence, it will be a trial of the individual, or an absent third party,
for the crime of bribery, intimidation, or the like, but unlike a criminal
trial, there will be no right to trial by jury289 and perhaps more importantly,
the government will not have to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The stakes are enormous for the previously-acquitted individual because
if the government prevails, it will be entitled to try him a second time
for the same offense. For this reason, it is virtually certain that the
previously-acquitted individual, if not indigent, will expend significant
resources to "defend" himself at the hearing.2 9 ° Additionally, he will
inevitably suffer the anxiety and stress caused not only by the hearing
itself but also by the realization that, if he loses his motion, he will be
tried again for the same offense and could be convicted and punished for
that offense.291
Moreover, the anxiety, stress, and expense will probably not end at the
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing because it is likely that the losing
party will appeal the decision.292 The individual will then be required to
allegedly committed at a trial in which he was acquitted of an offense is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing when the government contends that its prosecution of the individual
is permissible under a "newly discovered evidence" exception to the collateral estoppel
component).
287. E.g., United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 283 (2d Cir. 2006); United States
v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 272 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Collazo-Aponte, 216
F.3d 163, 198 (1st Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 532 U.S. 1036 (2001); Doyle,
121 F.3d at 1089; People v. Smith, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 472, 480 & n.1 1 (Ct. App. 2005);
State v. Green, 687 So. 2d 109, 113 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
288. People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615 (111. App. Ct. 1996).
289. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that
"[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This provision binds the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), and applies to all "serious" crimes, id. at 158-60. For a
discussion of what constitutes a serious crime for these purposes, see 3 RUDSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 127, 14.02.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
292. E.g., People v. Deems, 410 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ill. 1980) (interpreting Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) to allow the government to appeal an order dismissing a
charge on double jeopardy grounds); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 604(f) ("The defendant may appeal
to the Appellate Court the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal proceeding on
continue to "defend" himself in the appellate courts. Even if he ultimately
prevails at the end of the appellate process, he will have likely endured
significant additional personal strain and expense in an effort to vindicate
his right against double jeopardy and avoid a second trial for the same
offense of which he was previously acquitted. Additionally, if he does
not ultimately prevail on his motion to dismiss, he must undergo the
embarrassment, anxiety, and expense of a second trial for the same
offense, 293 even though his original acquittal might in fact have been
untainted by fraud.
Thus, by judicially creating a tainted acquittal exception to the rule
against double jeopardy, the Illinois courts have opened every acquittal
that has ever been rendered or that will be rendered in that state to
subsequent challenge by the government, thereby frustrating the rule's
purposes of maintaining the finality of judgments and limiting the "distress
and trauma of the trial process ' 294 to a single trial for an offense. To
make matters worse, by merely requiring a preponderance of the evidence
to sustain a finding of fraud, the Illinois courts have made it much more
likely that a trial court will make a factual error in favor of the
government and wrongly conclude that an individual or a third party
acting at his behest or with his knowledge fraudulently procured the
original acquittal.295
In addition, the tainted acquittal exception created by the Illinois
courts frustrates nearly all the other purposes underlying the rule against
double jeopardy. The exception grants the government an enormous
power, open to abuse. An unscrupulous prosecutor, upset at the acquittal
of a particular individual and bent on harassing him, could bring a
grounds of former jeopardy."); see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661-62
(1977) (holding that an order issued in a federal trial court denying a pretrial motion to
dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds is immediately appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1291); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. IV 2004) (allowing the government to appeal
from an order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information, except when
the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit further prosecution); McGuinness v.
Commonwealth, 667 N.E.2d 818, 818 (Mass. 1996) (holding that a defendant can
immediately appeal an order denying his motion to dismiss an indictment on double
jeopardy grounds); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.20(1) (McKinney 2005) (allowing the
government to appeal an order dismissing an accusatory instrument or count thereof on,
inter alia, double jeopardy grounds); Commonwealth v. Haefner, 373 A.2d 1094, 1095
(Pa. 1977) (holding that an order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss a charge on double
jeopardy grounds is a final, appealable order).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 124-29.
294. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 36, 4.7.
295. Cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) ("The social cost of
placing the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is... an
increased risk that the guilty will go free."); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("If... the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a
preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would
be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons .... ).
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second prosecution for the same offense and falsely allege the previous
acquittal was "tainted" by fraud.296 By doing so, the prosecutor would
force the previously-acquitted, and factually innocent, individual to
defend himself a second time for the same offense, and if the prosecutor
succeeded in convincing a judge that the individual's original acquittal
was "tainted" 29 7-a task made easier by the preponderance of the evidence
standard-the previously-acquitted individual would be compelled to
undergo a second trial for that offense. Even if the prosecutor failed to
convict the individual at this second trial, she will have forced him to
undergo the "'heavy personal strain,',, 298 and perhaps expense, of a second
trial, thereby frustrating the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of
preventing the government from harassing an individual through repeated
trials for the same offense.299
The rule against double jeopardy is also intended to reduce the possibility
that an innocent individual will be erroneously convicted at a second
trial for the same offense. 300 The tainted acquittal exception created by
the Illinois courts frustrates this purpose, for if at the evidentiary hearing the
government succeeds in convincing the judge by a preponderance of the
evidence that the individual's previous acquittal resulted from fraudulent
conduct, it could retry him for the same offense. At that second trial, the
296. It is possible that the prosecutor in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970),
discussed supra in note 282, was harassing the accused in that case when he brought him
to trial for robbing one of six participants in a poker game after he already had been tried
and acquitted of robbing another of the participants. The case report does not reveal the
prosecutor's motive for bringing the accused to trial a second time. Although he might
honestly have believed that the jury in the person's first trial reached the wrong result
and that the second trial was constitutionally permissible, see Hoag v. New Jersey, 356
U.S. 464, 467-72 (1958) (holding that the State of New Jersey did not violate the
Constitution when, after an individual was acquitted of robbing three people at a tavern,
it tried him for robbing a fourth person who had been robbed in the same incident), it is
possible that he believed that the individual did not actually commit the robbery in
question, but nevertheless brought him to trial a second trial in order to harass him.
297. If the prosecutor is initially unsuccessful, the prosecutor could of course press
the matter in the appellate courts. See supra text accompanying note 292.
298. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (quoting
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
299. For a discussion of the double jeopardy rule's purpose of preventing harassment,
see supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
Even if the unscrupulous prosecutor failed to obtain a second trial, she still would have
achieved her goal of harassing the previously-acquitted individual by forcing him to
begin defending himself a second time for the same offense and to undergo the burdens
imposed by the hearing on his motion to dismiss the charge on double jeopardy grounds.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 134-51.
government could "hon[e] its trial strategies ' '3°1 and "plug up the holes
in its case"3°2 based upon what it learned at the first trial and could
perhaps wear down the individual,30 3 thereby increasing its chances of
conviction despite factual innocence.
Moreover, to the extent that it, erroneously, retries previously-
acquitted individuals whose acquittals were not in fact "tainted" by
fraudulent conduct, the government frustrates the double jeopardy rule's
purpose of conserving scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources 30 4 that
could be better used investigating and prosecuting people who have not
previously been tried and acquitted of the same offense.30 5
Allowing the government to disregard a previous acquittal, charge an
individual a second time with the same offense, and try him a second
time for that offense after merely showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that his acquittal was "tainted" by fraudulent conduct may also
301. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,41 (1982).
302. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 459 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518 (1990), overruled on other grounds by United States
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980);
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
303. Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 (1986); DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130;
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978); see also supra text accompanying notes
147-49.
304. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of conserving
scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources, see supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
305. This purpose may also be frustrated when the individual's previous acquittal
was in fact "tainted". For example, in 1977, when Harry Aleman, see supra text
accompanying notes 260-80, was acquitted of the murder of William Logan, he was
released from custody. His freedom proved short-lived, however. He was taken into
custody the following year on another charge, and when, in 1993, the State of Illinois
indicted him a second time for the murder of Logan, he was in a federal prison serving
the first year of a twelve-year sentence for extortion. In fact, at the time of his 1993
indictment, Aleman had been in custody on one conviction or another for fifteen of the
previous sixteen years, see Dave McKinney, Panel Denies Parole for Reputed Hit Man
Aleman, Cites Bribe Claim, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at 16, available at 2005
WLNR 20296189; see also Maurice Possley, Mob Hit Man Aleman Sentenced to 100-
300 Years in 1972 Murder, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 1997, at 1 (reporting that at the
sentencing hearing following Aleman's 1997 conviction for murder, Aleman's attorney
claimed that Aleman had been imprisoned on federal charges for nineteen of the
previous twenty years), and would have remained in custody for the foreseeable future.
Perhaps the State of Illinois could have better spent its time and resources attempting to
convict individuals who were not already incarcerated. Moreover, at the same time it
indicted Aleman a second time for the murder of William Logan, the State of Illinois
also indicted him for a second murder. It therefore could be persuasively argued that if
the State of Illinois wanted to pursue a charge of murder against Aleman in 1993, it did
not need to try him again for the crime of which he had already been acquitted, even
though that acquittal may have been "tainted." Rather, it could have expended its time
and resources attempting to convict him of the murder for which he had yet to be tried.
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cause the public to lose confidence in, and respect for, the legal system.3 °6
Given the relatively low standard of proof necessary to allow a second
trial, members of the community may feel that the government is not
bound by an acquittal with which it disagrees and that citizens are not
adequately protected. Moreover, if the previously-acquitted individual is
convicted in his second trial for the same offense, the public may remain
uncertain about which of the two judgments is the "correct" one, and
they may begin asking whether the government is convicting factually
innocent individuals.
Finally, the tainted acquittal exception created by the Illinois courts
frustrates the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of protecting the
jury's power to acquit against the evidence,30 7 a purpose some scholars
view as the primary purpose underlying the protection against double
jeopardy.30 8 To illustrate, assume that in the trial of a factually guilty
individual the government introduced strong evidence of the individual's
guilt, certainly enough to prove the individual's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Despite this evidence, the jury engaged in an act of jury nullification,
or jury equity, and returned a verdict of not guilty. The government,
dismayed at the jury's acquittal in the face of strong evidence and convinced
of the acquitted individual's guilt, investigates and finds a modicum of
evidence indicating the possibility of jury tampering or witness intimidation.
It then brings a second charge against the individual for the same offense,
alleging that the previous acquittal resulted from fraud. The strong evidence
of the individual's guilt, combined with the fact that a jury exercising its
power to acquit against the evidence does that not state that that was its
reason for acquitting the accused, may well lead a judge applying a
preponderance of the evidence standard erroneously to conclude that the
initial acquittal must have been "tainted". He therefore may permit the
government to proceed with the second trial, thereby overturning the original
jury's decision to acquit against the evidence.30 9
306. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of maintaining
the public's respect for, and confidence in, the legal system, see supra text accompanying
notes 173-79.
307. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy's purpose of protecting the
jury's power to acquit against the evidence, see supra text accompanying notes 152-61.
308. Westen & Drubel, supra note 152, at 84.
309. For example, assume that the government brought a charge of illegal
possession of a controlled substance against an individual in whose apartment the police
discovered a small quantity of marijuana. The individual, falsely, claimed that the
marijuana belonged to his roommate and that he had no knowledge of its presence. The
government planned to call a friend of the accused to testify that a week before the police
As can be seen, the broad tainted acquittal exception developed by the
Illinois courts in the Aleman case makes significant inroads into the
protection accorded individuals by the rule against double jeopardy.310
On the other hand, the tainted acquittal exception created by Parliament in
the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is arguably narrow
enough and contains sufficient safeguards for previously-acquitted individuals
that it will not do so to any significant extent. Nevertheless, the Author
still does not believe it was wise for Parliament to have created the
exception.
The tainted acquittal provisions of the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996 allow a prosecutor to apply to the High Court to
quash an acquittal 311 only after "a person has been convicted of an
administration of justice offence [3 12 involving interference with or
intimidation of a juror or a witness (or potential witness) in any proceedings
which led to the acquittal. 313 To attain such a conviction, the government
must convince a fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
engaged in such conduct 314 and must do so in a trial in which the
accused is accorded all the rights of a criminal defendant, including,
when applicable, the right to trial by jury.3 15 The Act also provides that
discovered the marijuana, the friend observed the accused purchase marijuana from a
third party. The friend, however, failed to appear at the trial, and the government presented its
case without her testimony. Although the evidence showing that the marijuana belonged
to the accused was strong, the jury acquitted the accused. In fact, unbeknownst to the
government or the court, the jurors found that the government had proved its case against
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt but acquitted him because it believed that
possession of a small amount of marijuana should not constitute a criminal offense.
After the trial, the government investigated the friend's failure to appear at the trial and
discovered some evidence-but not enough to convince a fact finder beyond a
reasonable doubt-that shortly before the trial the accused may have intimidated her into
leaving the jurisdiction for several weeks. The government then charged the individual
with illegally possessing the same marijuana, based upon the same incident for which he
previously was acquitted, and following a hearing, the trial judge, erroneously, concluded that
the original acquittal was tainted and that the previously-acquitted individual must stand
trial a second time for the same offense.
310. The Author has previously argued that the exception to the guarantee against
double jeopardy created by the Illinois courts violates the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution. Rudstein, supra note 201, at 651.
311. See Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(3) (Eng.); see
also THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., RE-TRIALs, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/sectionl5/
chapter b.html (last visited May 6, 2008).
312. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
313. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(l)(b) (Eng.) (emphasis
added) (footnote added).
314. See supra note 16.
315. SPRACK, supra note 38, at § 18.01 ("If the accused pleads not guilty [to an
indictment], then, unless the prosecution chooses to offer no evidence, a trial must be
held .... Subject to... exceptional situations, a jury must be empanelled (or, more
colloquially, sworn in)."); but see Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 44 (Eng.) (allowing ajudge of the Crown Court, upon application of the prosecutor, to order that a defendant
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before a prosecutor can apply to the High Court for an order quashing an
acquittal, the court in which the person was convicted of the administration
of justice offense must find that "there is a real possibility that, but for
the interference or intimidation, the acquitted person would not have
been acquitted. 3 16 Moreover, before the High Court can quash an acquittal,
it must conclude that it is "likely that, but for the interference or
intimidation, the acquitted person would not have been acquitted., 3 17 In
contrast to the approach taken by the Illinois courts in the Aleman case,
these requirements provide, at the outset, judicial oversight of a prosecutor's
decision to seek to prosecute an individual for the same offense of which
he was previously acquitted, thereby precluding the prosecutor from
merely charging an individual with such an offense and compelling him
to defend himself a second time for that offense. In doing so, the
requirements to a great extent alleviate the constant anxiety that a
previously-acquitted individual, even one factually innocent of the crime
of which he was acquitted, might otherwise suffer if a prosecutor could
disregard the previous acquittal and charge the individual with the same
crime of which he was previously acquitted, based solely on her own
determination that fraud "tainted" that previous acquittal.
The requirement that a person be convicted of an administration of
justice offense also significantly decreases the chances that the government
will, because of a factual error, obtain a new trial in a case in which an
administration of justice offense did not actually occur. This in turn
means that it is highly unlikely that the government will subject a
factually innocent individual to the "embarrassment, expense, and
ordeal" 318 of a second trial for the same offense or that the second trial
be tried without a jury if it is satisfied that "there is evidence of a real and present danger
that jury tampering would take place" and that, "notwithstanding any steps (including the
provision of police protection) which might reasonably be taken to prevent jury
tampering, the likelihood that it would take place would be so substantial as to make it
necessary in the interests of justice for the trial to be conducted without a jury," and
giving as "examples of cases" in which "there may be evidence of a real and present
danger that jury tampering would take place.., a case where jury tampering has taken
place in previous criminal proceedings involving the defendant" and "a case where there
has been intimidation ... of any person who is likely to be a witness in the trial").
316. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(2)(a) (Eng.). It
must also appear to the court that it would not, "because of [the] lapse of time or any
other reason, . . . be contrary to the interests of justice to take proceedings against the
acquitted person for the offence of which he was acquitted." Id. §§ 54(5), 54(2)(b).
317. Id. § 55(1).
318. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
283
will convict an innocent person. 319  The conviction requirement also
makes it unlikely that the fact finder in the individual's first trial
exercised its prerogative and acquitted against the evidence. As discussed
above, 320 when a juror, witness, or potential witness was bribed or
intimidated, an acquittal almost certainly will have resulted either entirely,
or in large part, from the bribe or intimidation, and not from the fact
finder's exercising its power to nullify the law. Moreover, even if the
fact finder actually acquitted against the evidence, allowing the
government to retry the individual for the same offense would not be an
attack upon the fact finder's power to acquit against the evidence
because in exercising the power in the particular case, it presumably did
so in light of the evidence it heard at trial. However, that evidence may
have misled the fact finder, either because it resulted from perjured
testimony induced through bribery or intimidation, or because it was
incomplete due to the absence of one or more potential witnesses who
319. It is of course possible that, despite the conviction of a person for an
administration of justice offense, the High Court might err in finding, as it must, that it
appears "likely" that, absent the interference or intimidation by the convicted person, the
acquitted individual would not have been acquitted. Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 55(1) (Eng.). Arguably, the chances of this occurring
are increased somewhat because of the nature of the "hearing" in the High Court-the
previously-acquitted individual must merely be "given a reasonable opportunity to make
written representations to the [High] Court," id. § 55(3) (emphasis added), and
apparently has no right to appear before the High Court and testify under oath, no right
to call witnesses in his behalf or to present other evidence to contest the government's
claim that his acquittal was in fact "tainted", or, because the Act does not contemplate the
government's examining witnesses before the High Court, no right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses relied upon by the government to support its claim that it is "likely"
that the interference or intimidation led to the individual's acquittal. Nevertheless, the
High Court, when deciding whether to quash an acquittal, will know the nature of the
interference or intimidation, as found beyond a reasonable doubt by the fact finder in the
trial court, and in most cases will not need additional information to decide whether it
appears likely that the interference or intimidation resulted in the individual's acquittal.
For example, if the government succeeded in convicting a person, perhaps the
previously-acquitted individual, of bribing or intimidating one or more jurors in the
previously-acquitted individual's first trial, it generally will be reasonable to conclude,
on the basis of that information alone, that it is likely that the acquittal would not have
occurred but for the bribe or intimidation. Similarly, in a case in which the government
succeeded in convicting a person, perhaps the previously-acquitted individual, of bribing
a witness to testify falsely at the previously-acquitted individual's first trial, the
government's presentation of a copy of the trial transcript showing how the witness
testified at that trial and of a sworn affidavit from the witness stating what her truthful
testimony would have been, if it is not apparent from her testimony at the person's trial
for the administration of justice offense, should provide the High Court with enough
information to decide, in light of the previously-acquitted individual's written responses,
whether it is likely that the previously-acquitted individual would not have been
acquitted but for the perjured testimony. Thus, the likelihood that the High Court will
make a factual error and quash the acquittal of a factually innocent individual is not
great.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 239-40.
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were bribed or intimidated to go into hiding or to leave the jurisdiction.
Therefore, one cannot tell whether the fact finder would have exercised
its power to acquit against the evidence if it had heard all the relevant
facts, including the truthful testimony of those witnesses who perjured
themselves or who failed to appear at the trial.
The requirement of a conviction of an administration of justice offense
also limits the ability of the government to use the exception as a means
to harass a previously-acquitted individual. An unscrupulous prosecutor
cannot merely charge the acquitted with the same offense and force him
to defend himself a second time. She first has to charge someone, perhaps
the previously-acquitted individual, with an administration of justice
offense and then, in a criminal trial at which the person is accorded all
the rights of a criminal defendant, prove that person's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Only then could she even begin the process of seeking to
have the High Court quash the previous acquittal so she could retry the
previously-acquitted individual for the offense. Moreover, an unscrupulous
prosecutor, not caring about actually retrying the previously-acquitted
individual, could not use the "hearing" in the High Court as a means of
harassment. For even if the government convicts a person of an
administration of justice offense and applies to the High Court for an
order quashing the previously-acquitted individual's acquittal, the limited
nature of the hearing in the High Court3 2 2 does not place the same
burdens on the previously-acquitted individual as the pretrial evidentiary
hearing conducted in the Aleman case. It would not, in essence, be a
criminal trial for bribery or intimidation because that trial previously
took place in a separate proceeding. Indeed, the acquitted will not even
321. It is true that an unscrupulous prosecutor could harass a previously-acquitted
individual by charging him with an administration of justice offense even though she
knows that the individual did not commit any such offense. But an unscrupulous prosecutor
can harass any individual-whether previously acquitted or not-by charging him with
an offense she knows he did not commit. Moreover, a prosecution for an administration
of justice offense would not be for the same offense as that of which the individual was
previously acquitted and therefore would not be encompassed by the protection against
double jeopardy. It may not be wise to restrict a prosecutor's ability to bring such charges
merely because the offense is related to one covered by the protection against double
jeopardy and an unscrupulous prosecutor could use the prosecution as a means to harass
an individual. For, if the offense actually occurred, one would want the prosecutor to
bring a charge against the individual in order to punish him for it and to deter other
criminal defendants from attempting to gain acquittals through improper conduct.
322. See supra note 319.
be present at the High Court hearing and will not be allowed to call
witnesses to contest the prosecutor's case.
323
In addition, because the requirement of a conviction of an administration
of justice offense makes it highly likely that the previously-acquitted
individual's acquittal was in fact "tainted", the government, in most cases,
324
is not misallocating limited prosecutorial and judicial resources by
retrying the previously-acquitted individual for the same offense.
Rather, its use of those scarce resources is justified by the need to allow
the government a fair opportunity to convict those thought to have
committed a criminal offense.325
Finally, when the High Court quashes an acquittal, it is likely that the
previously-acquitted individual, or someone acting at his behest or with
his knowledge, actually committed an administration of justice offense
that led to the acquittal, for he will have been convicted and hence proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the public is less likely
to view a new trial of the previously-acquitted individual for the same
offense as a misuse of government power or to view an acquittal, in general,
as providing inadequate protection to those acquitted of committing
criminal offenses. Rather, members of the community will probably view
the second prosecution as justified in light of the almost-certain taint
attaching to the original acquittal. Also, should the previously-acquitted
individual be convicted at his second trial, the public would not tend to
view the conviction as being inconsistent with the result in his first
trial, because it is likely to view the original acquittal as tainted.
Allowing a second trial of an individual after the conviction of a person
of an administration of justice offense and a finding by the High Court
that it is likely that that person's intimidation of or interference with a
juror, witness, or potential witness led to the acquittal therefore will be
unlikely to cause the public to lose confidence in, or respect for, the
legal system.
In sum, because the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996
requires the conviction of a person for an administration of justice
offense before a prosecutor can seek to quash an acquittal, it provides
crucial protection to previously-acquitted individuals and significantly
reduces the inroads a tainted acquittal exception might otherwise make
on the underlying purposes of the rule against double jeopardy.
Nevertheless, the tainted acquittal exception created by the Act
frustrates those purposes to some extent. If the exception is widely used,
323. See Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 55(3) (requiring
that the previously-acquitted individual be "given a reasonable opportunity to make
written representations to the [High] Court" (emphasis added)).
324. But see supra note 305.
325. See supra text accompanying note 189.
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it remains inevitable that despite the requirement that a person be
convicted of an administration of justice offense factual errors will occur
and the acquittals of factually innocent individuals will be quashed,
forcing those individuals to undergo the "embarrassment, expense, and
ordeal" 326 of a second trial. Some are likely to be convicted in their second
trial, even though innocent. Perhaps most importantly though, the exception
opens every acquittal to subsequent challenge by the government and the
possibility that it might be quashed. No acquitted individual, including
those whose acquittals were untainted by fraud, could ever be absolutely
certain of finality, and must live in a constant state of anxiety that the
government will some day quash the acquittal. The exception therefore
frustrates what the Supreme Court of the United States has called "the
primary purpose 327 of the protection against double jeopardy: "preserv[ing]
the finality of judgments. 32 8
Any tainted acquittal exception to the rule against double jeopardy
thus entails some cost, in that it undermines the fundamental purposes of
the rule. Perhaps this cost would be worth incurring if the exception
allowed the government to prosecute and convict a large number of
individuals who otherwise would escape conviction and punishment for
their criminal acts. However, it does not seem that the exception created
by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 does so. Indeed,
in the twelve years since Parliament created the exception, it has never
been used to quash an acquittal and retry an individual for the same
offense.329 One reason for this may be that relatively few acquittals in
the United Kingdom result from interference with, or intimidation of, a
juror, witness, or potential witness. 330 If so, creating an exception to the
326. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
327. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978).
328. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978).
329. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 158, supra note 18,
§2.26; Interview with Ian D. Brownlee, Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Directorate,
Crown Prosecution Serv., in London, Eng. (Mar. 29, 2007).
330. One might, of course, argue that the mere presence of the exception has deterred
those charged with criminal offenses from procuring their acquittal by interfering with or
intimidating a juror, witness, or potential witness. There is no evidence to support this
conclusion, though. Indeed, a cost-benefit analysis indicates that, despite the presence of
the tainted acquittal exception to the rule against double jeopardy, a factually guilty
person charged with a serious offense would have little to lose and much to gain by
attempting to procure his acquittal by illegitimate means. If he did nothing, he is likely
to be convicted for the serious offense and severely punished for that offense. If, on the
other hand, he attempted to interfere with or intimidate a juror, witness, or potential
witness and failed, and the government discovered his attempt, he could be tried and
rule against double jeopardy for tainted acquittals is not worth the cost,
however limited it might be. Preserving the finality of all judgments
of acquittal and allowing a few guilty individuals to escape justice by
procuring an acquittal by unlawful means seems preferable to permitting
the government to pursue those individuals a second time at the cost of
opening every judgment of acquittal to re-examination and possibly
requiring some innocent individuals to defend themselves a second time
for the same offense, perhaps convicting and punishing them despite
their innocence.
V. CONCLUSION
In an attempt to prevent a guilty individual from escaping conviction
and punishment for an offense by using illegitimate means to engineer
his acquittal-an acquittal a former defendant could use to plead
autrefois acquit if the government ever again attempted to prosecute him
for the same offense-the United Kingdom Parliament created an
exception to the rule against double jeopardy that applies when an
individual's acquittal was "tainted" by certain kinds of criminal conduct.
The triggering mechanism under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations
Act is a conviction of a person for an administration of justice offense
involving interference with or intimidation of a juror, witness, or potential
witness. 3 Only after such a conviction and a finding by the court in
which the conviction occurred that "there is a real possibility that, but
for the interference or intimidation, the acquitted person would not have
been acq1uitted, ' '332 can the government ask the High Court to quash the
acquittal. This requirement of a conviction significantly limits the negative
impact the exception will have on the purposes underlying the rule against
double jeopardy. Nevertheless, the Author does not think Parliament acted
wisely in creating the exception.
convicted for his attempted interference or intimidation; but, the punishment for the
administration of justice offense is likely to be insignificant compared to the punishment
for the serious offense for which he was charged and of which he is likely to be convicted. If,
however, he succeeded, he would be acquitted of the original offense and could never
again be tried for that offense, unless the government discovered that he fraudulently
obtained his acquittal, convicted him of an administration of justice offense, and then
convinced the High Court to quash his tainted acquittal under the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. But even if the government succeeded in
having his previous acquittal quashed and then convicted him of the original offense,
the additional "cost" to him would merely be his, relatively minor, punishment for the
administration of justice offense.
331. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 54(l)(b) (Eng.).
332. Id. § 54(2)(a).
333. Id. § 54(3).
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The rule against double jeopardy, in the form of the pleas of autrefois
acquit and autrefois convict, has protected the English people against the
power of the government for hundreds of years. Although the rule, on
occasion, undoubtedly has shielded a factually guilty person from conviction
and punishment for his criminal conduct, occasionally freeing a guilty
party "is merely a part of the price that... society must pay in order to
preserve its freedom., 334 As the New Zealand Law Commission explained,
"[a] clear corollary of the rule [against double jeopardy] is that occasionally
the guilty will escape punishment, but that is inevitable in any system of
justice that must accommodate conflicting interests and finite resources. 33 5
The Author does not believe a sufficient case exists for tinkering with
the protections afforded by the rule against double jeopardy and therefore
concludes that it was unwise for Parliament to create the tainted acquittal
exception to that rule.
334. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) ("[T]here is nothing new in the realization
that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect...
us all."); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Decisions under the Fourth Amendment... have not given the protection to the citizen
which the letter and spirit of the Amendment would seem to require. One reason, I
think, is that wherever a culprit is caught red-handed, as in leading Fourth Amendment
cases, it is difficult to adopt and enforce a rule that would turn him loose. A rule
protective of law-abiding citizens is not apt to flourish where its advocates are usually
criminals. Yet the rule we fashion is for the innocent and guilty alike.").
335. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70, supra note 40, 14.
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V1. APPENDIX
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND INVESTIGATIONS ACT 1996
CHAPTER 25
PART VII MISCELLANEOUS AND GENERAL
TAINTED ACQUITTALS
§ 54 Acquittals tainted by intimidation, etc.
(1) This section applies where-
(a) a person has been acquitted of an offence, and
(b) a person has been convicted of an administration of justice
offence involving interference with or intimidation of a juror
or a witness (or potential witness) in any proceedings which
led to the acquittal.
(2) Where it appears to the court before which the person was
convicted that-
(a) there is a real possibility that, but for the interference or
intimidation, the acquitted person would not have been
acquitted, and
(b) subsection (5) does not apply,
the court shall certify that it so appears.
(3) Where a court certifies under subsection (2) an application may
be made to the High Court for an order quashing the acquittal,
and the Court shall make the order if (but shall not do so unless)
the four conditions in section 55 are satisfied.
(4) Where an order is made under subsection (3) proceedings may be
taken against the acquitted person for the offence of which he
was acquitted.
(5) This subsection applies if, because of lapse of time or for any
other reason, it would be contrary to the interests of justice to
take proceedings against the acquitted person for the offence of
which he was acquitted.
(6) For the purposes of this section the following offences are
administration of justice offences-
(a) the offence of perverting the course of justice;
(b) the offence under section 5 1(1) of the Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act 1994 (intimidation etc. of witnesses, jurors
and others);
(c) an offence of aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring, suborning
or inciting another person to commit an offence under
section 1 of the Perjury Act 1911.
(7) This section applies in relation to acquittals in respect of offences
alleged to be committed on or after the appointed day.
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(8) The reference in subsection (7) to the appointed day is to such
day as is appointed for the purposes of this section by the
Secretary of State by order.
§ 55 Conditions for making order.
(1) The first condition is that it appears to the High Court likely that,
but for the interference or intimidation, the acquitted person
would not have been acquitted.
(2) The second condition is that it does not appear to the Court that,
because of lapse of time or for any other reason, it would be
contrary to the interests of justice to take proceedings against the
acquitted person for the offence of which he was acquitted.
(3) The third condition is that it appears to the Court that the
acquitted person has been given a reasonable opportunity to make
written representations to the Court.
(4) The fourth condition is that it appears to the Court that the
conviction for the administration of justice offence will stand.
(5) In applying subsection (4) the Court shall-
(a) take into account all the information before it, but
(b) ignore the possibility of new factors coming to light.
(6) Accordingly, the fourth condition has the effect that the Court
shall not make an order under section 54(3) if (for instance) it
appears to the Court that any time allowed for giving notice of
appeal has not expired or that an appeal is pending.
§ 56 Time limits for proceedings.
(1) Where-
(a) an order is made under section 54(3) quashing an acquittal,
(b) by virtue of section 54(4) it is proposed to take proceedings
against the acquitted person for the offence of which he was
acquitted, and
(c) apart from this subsection, the effect of an enactment would
be that the proceedings must be commenced before a
specified period calculated by reference to the commission
of the offence,
in relation to the proceedings the enactment shall have effect as if the
period were instead one calculated by reference to the time the order is
made under section 54(3).
(2) Subsection (1)(c) applies however the enactment is expressed so
that (for instance) it applies in the case of-
[Repealed by Sexual Offences Act (2003 c. 42), Sch 7 1.]
(b) section 127(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (magistrates'
court not to try information unless it is laid within 6 months
from time when offence committed);
(c) an enactment that imposes a time limit only in certain
circumstances (as where proceedings are not instituted by or
with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions).
§ 57 Tainted acquittals: supplementary....
